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1. Introduction 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) have become increasingly popular in the last few decades.  In 2004, M&A deals in the 
U.S. totaled $875 billion (Berman, 2005).  Yet, it is well known that a large percentage of mergers fail to deliver synergies1 
for their shareholders. For example, a Business Week study (2002) announced that 61 percent of the acquisitions 
completed since 1998 decreased shareholder value for the acquirer. One of the foremost causes of such failures is lack of 
attention to integration (Schweiger and Goulet, 2000; Eccles et al., 1999, Yoo et al., 2004)2.  
One of the main reasons attributed to failures of mergers in the late 1980s was the lack of attention to merging information 
systems, specifically (Giacomazzi et al., 1997; McKiernan and Merali, 1995; Weber and Pliskin, 1996). At the same time, 
the success story of Sallie Mae’s acquisition of USA Group was attributed to successful post-merger IS integration (Brown et 
al., 2003). Likewise, successful integration of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia and State Bank of Victoria systems 
(Johnston and Yetton, 1996) suggests that IS integration can contribute to overall merger success.   
Despite a growing interest in how IS integration contributes to merger success, Aponovich (2002) cites an Accenture study 
that found that 75 percent of senior management underestimated the critical role of IS in achieving merger success, and 
only 16 percent chose to do sufficient IS due-diligence. This leads us to ask – why do most managers decide to approach IS 
integration without IS due-diligence? What are the key drivers behind choosing one integration approach over another? 
Does the chosen approach depend on the merger’s objectives? Presumably, it should (Giacomazzi et al., 1997; Main and 
Short, 1989), but does it? And, what role does IS alignment play in this?  
The alignment literature is founded on the axiomatic assumption that business-IS alignment leads to improvements in 
organizational performance (Sabherwal and Chan, 2001; Chan et al., 1997; Henderson and Venkatraman, 1992). Taking 
this assumption further--from a single firm to two merging firms--we believe that alignment issues should be a key 
component of integration decisions. Such a belief is consistent with the M&A literature (Giacomazzi et al., 1997; Main and 
Short, 1989; Brown and Renwick, 1996; Wijnhoven et al., 2006). Essentially, we expect the newly merged IS function to be 
aligned with the new business needs, which emerge from the merger’s strategic objectives. Thus, strategic business-IS 
alignment appears to be an appropriate lens through which to study IS integration decisions. For example, Giacomazzi et 
al. (1997) propose three IS integration strategies based on business objectives and merger goals. Brown and Renwick 
(1996) propose alternative IS governance arrangements for different types of acquisitions. With the exception of Johnston 
and Yetton (1996) and Wijnhoven et al. (2006), past literature either offers a conceptual framework without empirical 
support (e.g. Brown and Renwick, 1996) or empirical alignment during pre-merger planning (Main and Short, 1989). 
Further, while Main and Short (1989), and Wijnhoven et al. (2006) focus on the integration process, they do not report on 
‘complete’ integration. Hence, there are few studies that report on integration completed in the way IS strategy was actually 
implemented.   
Past literature has sought to understand IS integration decisions using the Henderson and Venkatraman (1992) framework 
(cf. Wijnhoven et al., 2006) and the Mintzberg (1979) framework (cf. Johnston and Yetton, 1996). However, since sourcing 
arrangements have now become an integral component of any IS strategy (Hirschheim and Sabherwal, 2001), we attempt 
to capture IS integration decisions based on the Hirschheim and Sabherwal framework. Furthermore, past literature has 
identified factors such as ‘short-term need to reduce complexity’ (Johnston and Yetton, 1996); scalability, cost, performance 
(response time, concurrent users), and reliability (Brown et al., 2003); and government regulation, IT user participation and 
hospital association membership (Wijnhoven et al., 2006). Yet, a more coherent theory of IS integration decision making 
still eludes us (Wijnhoven et al., 2006). Thus, we aim to: 
1. Examine business-IS alignment as reflected in IS integration decisions in a merger context, and 
2. Identify factors that shape these IS integration decisions.  
                                                   
1 Synergy is defined as an “increase in performance of the combined firm over what the two firms are already expected or required to accomplish as 
independent firms” (Sirower, 1997, p. 6). 
2 The difficulty of successfully integrating two large monoliths such as HP and Compaq was not lost on Carly Fiorina and her integration team as noted in 
the Financial Times (2002). 
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While this study does not specifically seek to explain integration success, we will reflect on the impact of integration 
decisions on merger success where possible.  
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2, we provide a definition of M&A followed by a research framework on 
alignment profiles that match IS strategies to business-level strategies as well as the corporate strategy of a horizontal 
integration merger. We then use this framework as a starting point for data collection and analyses to address the question: 
What generates alignment or misalignment? In section 3, we outline our research method. In section 4, we present three oil 
and gas merger case histories. In section 5, we interpret within-case analyses of data that spans pre- and post-merger 
phases. In section 6, we conduct cross-case analyses to highlight factors that contribute to the IS integration decisions. We 
discusses limitations of the research and outline implications for future practice and research in Section 7. 
2. Theoretical Development 
2.1 M&A Context: Process 
In this paper, the terms: ‘mergers’ and ‘acquisitions’ are used interchangeably3.  For the purpose of this paper, we divide 
the merger timeline into two broad phases: pre-merger and post-merger. The pre-merger phase consists of: strategic 
planning; searching for a partner; due diligence analysis; engaging in negotiations; making public announcements; and 
gaining Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC), European Commission’s (EC) and shareholders’ approval. This phase ends on 
‘Day One’ – the day the two entities close their deal and legally become a single entity.  The post-merger phase begins on 
Day One and continues until the new firm “settles down.” The majority of post-merger changes occur within two years of 
Day One (Buono and Bowditch, 1989; Ashkanasky and Holmes, 1995), but integration may continue for many years 
afterward (Empson, 2000). 
2.2 M&A Context: Merger Integration 
In the M&A literature, the received view is that merger integration involves a combination of some or all organizational 
assets, people, processes, and technology, resulting in ‘wholeness’ (Schweiger and Goulet, 2000; Lajoux, 1998; 
Shrivastava, 1986). Schweiger (2002) discusses three levels of integration, from highest to lowest: (a) physical consolidation 
of two sets of assets and functions, (b) standardization of two functions that remain separate post-merger, and (c) 
coordination of functions that remain separate and unstandardized. The focus of our study, ‘horizontal integration’ involves 
the highest level of integration (Schweiger, 2002). Horizontal integration is a type of M&A and involves a merger of two 
competitors in the same stage of the product-market cycle. 
2.3 M&A Context: IS Integration 
According to Giacomazzi et al. (1997, p. 290): 
Integration of the two IS units does not necessarily imply that a single system, a software environment, and 
architecture is chosen, but that exchange of data and organizational processes, according to the merged 
organization needs, are possible and efficient.  
They define different levels (e.g., total, partial) of IS integration depending on “the number and kind of business processes 
supported by the same [or standardized] software packages” (p. 291). For Weber and Pliskin (1996, p. 85), however, IS 
integration means a single system and a single IS function for the merged firm. Based on these works, we define IS 
integration as: changes in IS strategy, IS structure, and systems supporting the combined IS and business units that allow 
them to function as a whole.  
The IS integration literature largely emphasizes alignment as a key aspect of merger integration. But to what extent do 
organizations pursue business-IS strategic alignment in selecting their new IS configuration? If they strategically choose the 
new IS configuration based on a business strategy, it would be reflected in their post-merger alignment status. We assess 
this by looking at the various components of alignment both pre- and post-merger. 
                                                   
3 Mergers and acquisitions do differ in terms of the financial transaction and the ensuing tax benefits. However, the implications for integration remain 
similar. 
  
146 
Issue 3 Volume 8 Article 1 
2.4 Business-IS Strategic Alignment 
Strategic alignment is the extent to which the business mission, objectives, and plans are supported by the IS mission, 
objectives, and plans (Reich and Benbasat, 2000; Sambamurthy and Zmud, 1999). This is not a state but a “process of 
continuous adaptation and change,” as emphasized by Hirschheim and Sabherwal (2001, p. 87). 
Next, we base our alignment framework on the work of Hirschheim and Sabherwal (2001) for two reasons. First, their work 
is relatively recent, and includes sourcing options and IS structure as components of IS strategy leading to a more holistic 
view of IS strategy. It’s been nearly 20 years since the Kodak outsourcing deal, but only now has IS sourcing appeared on 
the radar screen of senior management (Lacity et al., 1996, Dibbern et al., 2004). We felt that by using Hirschheim and 
Sabherwal categories, we would be able to systematically study IS sourcing decisions in the context of mergers. Second, this 
framework has already been applied to study strategy contexts involving change. This aligns well with the notion of a merger 
as a revolutionary change.  
Like any other framework, this framework has some trade-offs to consider – for instance, it does not look at IS infrastructure 
and processes like Henderson and Venkatraman (1992). The Henderson and Venkatraman framework, however, does not 
provide a way to operationalize IS infrastructure, so we eliminated it from consideration. Alternatively, we could have 
selected Earl’s (1996) process alignment model, but we found it was too broadly defined for our research focus. Another 
limitation of the Hirschheim and Sabherwal framework is the operationalization of IS structure. In particular, the professed IS 
structure typology may not be fine-grained enough for analyzing complex structures within large multinationals. Yet, given 
its parsimonious nature, it suffices as a starting point for further theory development.  
2.4.1 Corporate and Business Strategy 
Essentially, a strategy reflects a firm’s awareness of how to compete, against whom, when, where, and for what (Pearce and 
Robinson, 1985).  The Business-IS alignment literature focuses on corporate- and business-level strategies.  Corporate 
strategy answers the questions: “What business should we be in?” and ”How do we enter the business?” (Stahl and Grigsby, 
1991, p. 77). Business strategy articulates how to compete within that specific business (Stahl and Grigsby, 1991). For a 
multi-business firm, corporate strategy drives business strategies.  For a holistic treatment, we include both corporate 
strategy and business strategy, since the unit of analysis is the merger of entire corporations that may deal in multiple 
businesses.  
Past management and IS literature has applied several typologies for corporate and business strategies such as the Miles 
and Snow (1978) typology of defenders, analyzers and prospectors. The M&A literature outlines specific corporate strategies 
such as vertical integration, horizontal integration, joint ventures and divestitures. In this study, we focus on Horizontal 
Integration mergers--a growth strategy applied to merging partners who are competitors. Such mergers provide access to 
new markets, eliminate competition, and allow gains in competitive capabilities or economies of scale through increased 
production capacity (Thompson and Strickland, 1984).     
To differentiate business level strategies, we use Porter’s (1987) highly cited work to distinguish between: cost-leadership 
(gained through economies of scale), combination, and differentiation (gained through unique products/services). Any one 
of these business strategies can be found within the corporate strategy of a horizontal integration merger.  
2.4.2 IS Strategy 
Hirschheim and Sabherwal (2001) view IS strategy as composed of: the Role of IS, IS sourcing, and IS structure.  
Role of IS reflects the way the IS function is perceived by the organization’s senior management (Peppard and Ward, 1999; 
Hirschheim and Sabherwal, 2001).  An IS role focused on efficiency is achieved through process-level improvements and 
realized through a centralized IS structure. An opportunistic IS role focused on market flexibility requires quick decisions and 
is achieved through seizing new opportunities. It is attained through a decentralized IS structure.  A comprehensive IS role is 
achieved through careful decisions and quick responses and is realized through a hybrid or a shared IS structure.   
IS Sourcing refers to “the internal and external sources of IS products and services offered to a particular firm” (Hirschheim 
and Sabherwal, 2001, p. 89).  IS outsourcing is associated with third-party management of IS assets, people and 
processes.  Sourcing 80 percent or more of an IS budget to third-party vendors is considered outsourcing, appropriate when 
IS is merely a commodity (support) function.  Sourcing 20 percent or less of an IS budget to third-party vendors is 
considered insourcing, appropriate when IS is a critical differentiator. Lacity et al. (1996) and Lacity and Willcocks (1998) 
identify a variation of insourcing called ‘buy-in’. Organizations hire resources to meet temporary needs, thus allowing the 
“in-house management to retain full visibility and control of the IS activity” (Lacity et al., 1996, p. 18). Sourcing between 20 
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to 80 percent (40 percent typically) of the IS budget to third-party vendors is called selective sourcing, appropriate when the 
role of IS is comprehensive.   
IS Structure refers to “the configuration of the IS function and the locus of responsibility for IS management decisions” 
(Hirschheim and Sabherwal, 2001). We use the centralized, decentralized and hybrid4 typology to classify IS structure. In a 
centralized structure, IS decision making is controlled by a centralized or corporate IS unit (Brown and Magill, 1994).  In a 
decentralized structure, IS decision making is controlled by each business unit, where IS personnel report to the business 
units.  With a hybrid IS structure, part of the decision making authority lies with a centralized IS unit, and part lies with the 
business units.  Centralization affords greater efficiencies (economies of scale), and integration and “helps manage IS 
outsourcing arrangements…without redundancy (Rockart et al., 1996); while decentralization provides local (business unit) 
control and ownership of resources, and quicker responses and better customization to users in insourcing arrangements” 
(Hirschheim and Sabherwal, 2001, p. 90). A hybrid IS structure maps to a selective sourcing arrangement.  
An alignment profile is a congruent set including structures, sourcing arrangements, and the role of IS. For example, a 
hybrid IS structure, selective sourcing and comprehensive IS role together form one alignment profile since the elements 
match one another (Hirschheim and Sabherwal, 2001). 
2.4.3 Synthesizing the Alignment Components 
As discussed earlier, horizontal integration can imply market consolidation, or access to new markets or products/services 
(Thompson and Strickland, 1984). Market consolidation, or cost leadership, is achieved by lowering IS procurement costs 
through increased buying power, lowering fixed costs through elimination of redundancy (e.g., human resources and IS), 
and increasing prices through elimination of competitors (Schweiger, 2002). To lower these costs, “most, if not all, 
organizational functions and activities have to be [physically] consolidated and standardized” (Schweiger, 2002, p. 35). If a 
merger’s primary business goal is to realize economies of scale, we expect senior management to view the IS function in an 
efficiency (support) role. Accordingly, the IS function would be outsourced (Dibberns et al., 2004), with elements of buy-in 
(Lacity et al., 1996) and its governance structure centralized, which enables standardization and physical consolidation of 
the two sets of systems and supporting staff. In contrast, if horizontal integration is driven entirely by product/service 
differentiation, then the IS function would be leveraged in a more opportunistic (strategic) role.  After Hirschheim and 
Sabherwal (2001), the IS function would then be insourced and decentralized. Finally, when a merger is driven both by 
economies of scale and product/service differentiation, we expect the role of IS to become comprehensive, sourcing 
arrangements to be selective, and the IS structure to be shared (Brown and Magill, 1994).  
Assuming a corporate strategy must drive business strategies, we expect some economies of scale to be realized in any 
horizontal integration. This is because a horizontal integration brings together two firms that are in the same business and 
have some similar business processes. Therefore, IS functions supporting these businesses will also overlap in skill sets and 
application portfolio. Some cost savings through economies of scale can indeed be gained from integrating IS functions 
and systems.  
Table 1: Ideal Post-Merger Business-IS Alignment Profile for Horizontal Integration based on Hirschheim and 
Sabherwal (2001) 
Corporate Strategy IS Role IS Sourcing IS Structure 
Product/Service 
Differentiation  
Opportunistic Insourced Decentralized 
Cost 
leadership 
strategy  
Efficient/Support Outsourced + ‘buy in’ Centralized 
Horizontal 
Integration 
Combination Comprehensive Selective Sourcing + ‘buy 
in’ 
Shared (Brown and 
Magill, 1994) 
 
Table 1 summarizes our research framework based on Hirschheim and Sabherwal’s (2001) strategic business-IS alignment 
components in the context of horizontal integration mergers. The constructs outlined in the framework will be used to 
identify merging organizations’ IS integration decisions; specifically about the role of IS, IS structure and IS sourcing 
arrangements. This will help us to examine business-IS alignment as reflected in IS integration decisions in a merger context. 
                                                   
4 Here, we are not specifically differentiating exactly which part of the IS function is decentralized and centralized, unlike the specific differences that Brown 
and Magill (1994) highlight by defining hybrid or shared or federal governance as central management of technology and decentralized management of 
use of technology. Unless we specifically quote Brown and Magill or our data, we use the terms ‘hybrid’ and ‘shared’ interchangeably. 
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Simultaneously, this will help us to explore the extent to which the business-IS alignment rationale governs IS integration 
decisions in pre- and post-merger phases. We assume that if the merging organizations consciously consider alignment in 
making integration choices, it will be reflected in the implementation of IS structure, role, and sourcing so as to be in 
alignment with one another and merger goals. Finally, if we find that business-IS alignment logic does not explain IS 
integration choices, we will look for other contextual factors to explain IS integration decision making.  
3. Research Method 
A merger is a complicated phenomenon, characterized by high uncertainty and sensitive information in a highly charged, 
emotional environment. Therefore, we followed a multi-site qualitative case study method in order to study this type of 
phenomenon in its natural setting (Yin, 2003; Pare, 2004). In case research, generalizations are possible mainly toward the 
analytical framework or theory used to inform the research (Eisenhardt, 1989; Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991; Yin, 2003; 
Walsham, 1995) – in our case, business-IS strategic alignment and its role in merger integration decision making. Thus, 
instead of offering propositions and their validations, we shall introduce themes, or tendencies, which explain IS integration 
decision making at the studied mergers. These will not, however, be strongly predictive of future merger integration decision 
making.  
The credibility (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) of our work is achieved by providing rich case descriptions and relevant 
quotations from transcripts or internal publications to create a satisfactory chain of evidence (Yin, 2003), and by 
triangulating5 data from multiple sources (Denzin, 1978) To cover both sides of the story, we interviewed both acquirer and 
target participants. We compared these data with internal publications such as newsletters and presentations, for 
triangulation. More importantly, clarifications of contradictory evidence were presented in follow-up interviews to see if they 
were considered plausible. 
3.1 Site Selection 
Site selection was pragmatic,6 as access to the sensitive/secretive phenomena of mergers is difficult to attain. Using 
theoretical sampling (Pare, 2004), we found three horizontal integration mergers the corresponded with our corporate 
strategy construct. Similarly, in line with our business strategy construct, two of these mergers engaged in cost leadership, 
while the third followed product differentiation. These three mergers of six Fortune 500, public, multinationals in the oil and 
gas industry had deals valued at over $1 billion. We labeled the first merged firm AmazonNile, where Amazon acquired 
Nile. We labeled the second MekongIndus, where Mekong acquired Indus. We called the third SeineLena, where Seine 
acquired Lena. Given the extremely sensitive nature of mergers, we were happy to find that our sample sites satisfied the 
business strategy construct in two out of the three categories. Since we did not find a merger that was motivated by a 
combination of cost-leadership and product-differentiation, we will be careful in drawing conclusions that apply to such a 
context. By having two cases that belonged to the same category, cost leadership, we have the additional advantage of 
being able to explore possible replication logic between AmazonNile and MekongIndus.  
3.2 Participant Selection 
We selected our participants who had been on the IS integration task force of their merging firms or were informally 
involved in IS integration decision making and implementation. They were typically located at the corporate headquarters or 
in a city where there was a significant IS presence. The firms’ integration team actually made the decisions (Marks and 
Mirvis, 1998) beyond the financials of the deal, prioritized integration projects, and allocated resources (Tetenbaum, 1999). 
By necessity, they were senior IS managers (e.g., CIO, or account manager or senior managers). We sought at least two 
members from each heritage7 organization – resulting in at least four participants from each merger. This is consistent with 
Sanders (1982), who notes: “It is realistic to believe that sufficient information may be collected from approximately three to 
six individuals” (p. 356). In these merger contexts, interviewing more people would not necessarily lead to more insightful 
data because few8 interviewees were deeply involved in IS integration decisions. Thus, we could reach the point of 
theoretical saturation (Pare, 2004; Yin, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989) within the range specified by Sanders (1982) and Pare 
                                                   
5 Denzin (1978) posits four types of triangulations – (1) using different sources of data, (2) using different researchers to collect and interpret data, (3) 
using multiple theories to interpret a single set of data, and (4) using multiple methods to study a single problem. 
6 These mergers were accessible because they had longstanding relationships with one of the researchers. 
7 Heritage’ refers to a place of origin. There is a history, a culture, a way of working, a set of values, that merging organizations bring to the table. People, 
processes and systems can come from either the acquirer or target heritage 
8 During a merger, typically very few people are involved in the actual decision-making in the initial phase (e.g. the top 100 executives world-wide, but this 
depends on the size of the merging organizations, among other factors). Out of this hundred, very few are in-charge of the IS decision-making – for 
instance, in one merger, one out of seven teams were the IS integration team and had only five people on that team. In another case, the IS integration 
team was part of the Finance team and had three members from each heritage organization. In the later stages of the decision-making, more people are 
brought on board. 
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(2004). If we did not reach theoretical saturation, then we sought more managers. Accordingly, we continued to conduct 
follow-up interviews even when they retired post-merger. 
3.3 Data Sources 
Interviews, internal documents, public records (i.e., SEC Filings: Schedule 13D and DEFM14A forms) and news articles were 
the main sources of data collection. We also collected press releases announcing each merger’s synergies. The internal 
documents we analyzed included presentations and internal newsletters. In one merger, we were shown, but not allowed to 
take away or copy, an intranet application showing the cost-benefit analysis of the merger integration. We conducted the 
interviews from 2001 to 2005. At least two ‘snap shots’ of each merger were taken through thirty-six interviews (see Table 
2), each lasting between 30 to 180 minutes, often followed up with email clarifications and comparisons with previous 
findings. We taped and transcribed each interview.  
Table 2: Interviews organized by heritage, merger and snapshot of the merger timeline 
Merger Merger Timeline Acquirer Heritage Target Heritage 
Amazon + Nile Pre-Merger   
 Early Post-Merger 4 2 
 Late Post-Merger 8 2 
 Total 12 4 
Mekong + Indus Pre-Merger 2 1 
 Early Post-Merger 1 1 
 Late Post-Merger 3 2 
 Total 6 4 
Seine + Lena Pre-Merger   
 Early Post-Merger 1 1 
 Late Post-Merger 3 5 
 Total 4 6 
 
The interviews were semi-structured in nature (Pare, 2004). While questioning the participants, we tried to ensure that they 
(a) were allowed to express their opinions on issues they considered important, and (b) answered our questions related to 
strategic alignment and IS integration. The interview guide presented in Appendix A functioned as rough template.  After 
each interview, we modified the questions to incorporate the findings of the previous interviews and to add emergent themes 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The original strategic alignment framework also began to tighten, and themes constituting ‘theory’ on IS 
integration decision making during mergers began to emerge. 
3.4 Data Analysis 
We loaded all transcripts and external reports into an NVivo 2.0 project, each document showing the year it was 
documented, the interview round, and the firm’s pseudonym. We also loaded a ‘starting list’ of codes (Miles and 
Huberman, 1984) developed from our strategic alignment framework and a literature review (See Table 3) into NVivo as 
‘nodes’ or trees of nodes. This list is provided in Column 3 in Tables 4,5,7,8, and 10. Using NVivo, the researchers then 
selectively ‘read’ the text by highlighting and coding the transcripts (Van Manen, 1990), which resulted in pieces of text 
highlighted against a particular node. This enabled the participants’ comments to be applied in the context of the alignment 
framework in Table 1. Next, we compared these responses for agreements and disagreements among the IS managers 
belonging to the same heritage, and then with the IS managers of the other heritage, resulting in within-case analyses.  
Nvivo also allowed us to generate tables of all the text that reflected a particular code or category, per merger. This allowed 
us to look for patterns in each category across all three cases, resulting in cross-case analysis.  Through iterative readings of 
the transcripts, some notions that were not part of the starting code list, were repeatedly revealed: these were identified as 
data-emergent factors that had an impact on IS integration decisions. These new categories were ‘open-coded’ in NVivo by 
creating new nodes. We also integrated these data-emergent categories into the list of codes, in keeping with Walsham’s 
(1995), Yin (2003), and Eisenhardt’s (1989) suggestion to remain open to the field data.  This constant comparison of data 
with the current categories in our framework made us realize that new categories were required to capture (a) IS integration 
decisions regarding applications and infrastructure, (b) the influence of geographical dispersion of multinationals on the IS 
reporting structure and (c) explanation of IS integration decisions that didn’t stem from the alignment rationale. As we 
continued our follow-up interviews, we compared the old data to our latest understanding, refining our data-emergent 
categories.  
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Table 3. Code List 
Starting and Data-emergent codes  Framework and Literature Review 
Motivation to merge: Trautwein, 1990 
 Lack of internal resources  Schweiger, 2002; Pearce and Robinson, 1985 
 Growth in global market Schweiger, 2002; Pearce and Robinson, 1985 
 To gain competitive advantage  Schweiger, 2002; Pearce and Robinson, 1985 
 Bandwagon effect: to avoid competitive 
 disadvantage (survival) 
Trautwein, 1990; Pangarkar, 2000 
 Cost saving synergies through consolidation/ 
 economies of scale  
Trautwein, 1990; Schweiger, 2002 
Selection criteria for merger partner:  Trautwein, 1990; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991 
 Capital assets (resources) Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991 
 Geographical overlap and complementary 
 customer-base;  
Schweiger, 2002; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991 
 Complementary business capabilities Schweiger, 2002; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991 
Synergy promises have a time component  Schweiger and Goulet, 2000; Graebner, 2004; Brown 
et al., 2003 
Role of IS (the way in which an organization’s senior 
management perceives IS):  
Peppard and Ward, 1999; Hirschheim and Sabherwal, 
2001 
 IS is perceived as a support or overhead function    Hirschheim and Sabherwal, 2001 
 Senior IS Manager [CIO] not perceived important 
 to be part of [pre-merger] decision-making 
Reich and Benbasat, 2000; Segars and Grover, 1998 
 Differentiator: strategic use of IS for competitive 
edge 
Sabherwal and Chan, 2001; Camillus and Lederer, 
1985 
Role of IS in [merger] corporate decisions King, 1978; Segars and Grover, 1998 
 Not significant in merger decisions Kendler, 2004 
 Senior management’s focus on IS integration  Brown et al., 2003; Johnston and Yetton, 1996 
IS Sourcing: Hirschheim and Sabherwal, 2001 
 Insourcing  Lacity and Hirschheim, 1995 
 Use of contractors Lacity and Hirschheim, 1995; Lacity et al., 1996 
 Sourcing factors: IS budget cuts  Lacity and Hirschheim, 1995; Lacity et al., 1996 
 Sourcing factors: Cultural values  Fowler and Jeffs, 1998; Allen et al., 2002  
 Selection criteria for outsourcing vendors – cost Lacity and Hirschheim, 1995; Lacity et al., 1996 
 Selective sourcing (application development) Lacity and Hirschheim, 1995; Lacity et al., 1996;  
IS structure: Brown and Magill, 1994; Brown and Magill, 1998 
 Regional versus global;  Tractinsky, and Jarvenpaa, 1995 
 Centralization (shared services)  Brown and Magill, 1994; Sabherwal et al., 2001; 
Camillus and Lederer, 1985 
 Centralization associated with efficiency and 
 cost savings  
Brown and Magill, 1994; Sabherwal et al., 2001; 
Hirschheim and Sabherwal, 2001 
 Decentralization  Brown and Magill, 1994; Camillus and Lederer, 1985; 
Hirschheim and Sabherwal, 2001 
 Flat: less hierarchy, decision-making at lowest 
 levels 
Mintzberg,  1983 
 Hybrid IS structure  Brown and Magill, 1994; Sabherwal et al., 2001; 
Hirschheim and Sabherwal, 2001 
 IS structure should match business structure Henderson and Venkatraman, 1992 
Standardization:  Tractinsky and Jarvenpaa, 1995; Karimi, and Konsynski, 
1991; Brown and Magill, 1994 
 Global standardization (of IS processes) Tractinsky and Jarvenpaa, 1995; Karimi, and Konsynski, 
1991; Ives and Jarvenpaa, 1991 
 Standardized IS processes supports efficiency  Giacomazzi et al., 1997;  
Acquirer-target power differential:  Hirsch, 1986; Pablo, 1994; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 
1991 
 Top Management Turnover from Target heritage; Bergh, 2001; Canella and Hambrick, 1993; Hirsch, 
1986  
 Senior job placements are reserved for Acquirer Canella and Hambrick, 1993; Haspelagh and Jemison, 
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 heritage; 1991; Hirsch, 1986 
 
Our data analysis section describes both data-emergent themes and research framework-based themes. Themes can take 
the form of patterns, rules, local meanings, common sense explanations, and metaphors (Miles and Huberman, 1994). For 
instance, we discovered a set of rules common to MekongIndus and SeineLena that we called ‘Big Rules’ or ‘the Mekong 
way’, which essentially involved adoption of all acquirer’s systems and processes by the merged organization. Eisenhardt 
(1989) specifically considers themes to be one of the many forms of theory-building. To improve construct validity, we 
accompanied these themes by what Eisenhardt (1989) calls ”enfolding prior literature” or we caompared our data-
emergent findings with supporting and conflicting prior literature. Taken together, we used these themes to build theory for 
IS integration decision making during mergers and acquisitions. The themes may or may not be common to all mergers.  
4. Merger Histories 
Oil and gas is a commodity business where scale and size matter. Our study firms merged at a time when the mature 
industry had already witnessed a gradual consolidation. For Amazon, Nile, Mekong, and Indus, global growth required 
large capital investments in infrastructure. These firms collectively promised several hundred million dollars to Wall Street in 
cost savings synergies resulting from economies of scale. Two years after Day One, all mergers were considered successful, 
since the expected merger synergies had been delivered within a given time frame acceptable to Wall Street9. Roughly ten 
percent of the overall synergies were to come through a reduction in the IT budget. 
None of the CIOs was involved in the initial due-diligence process. IS transition teams formed only after the announcement 
and consisted of 5 to 20 people. In all three mergers, IS integration teams decided to select one of the pre-existing acquirer 
or target systems because they had no time to explore the marketplace for a new one. They established a set of systems 
evaluation criteria including cost, scalability, and functionality; system migration risk and time; and contribution to overall 
synergy targets. The team scrambled to enable a single web presence and offer email capability by Day One. Interim 
solutions (e.g., software interfaces to port data across acquirer and target systems supporting the same business function) 
were cobbled together within the first few months after Day One, in order to allow the business side to quickly realize their 
synergies.  
AmazonNile: All adopted systems, regardless of heritage, had to meet Amazon’s Risk Management Framework10 
requirements. Major integration initiatives were: the standard desktop environment, the email systems, the ERP systems, and 
infrastructure management automation. From the two email platforms--Amazon’s EmailApp1 and Nile’s EmailApp2--the 
latter was selected, for it had additional collaboration and knowledge management features. Nile’s CIO, who was leading 
the IS integration effort, believed these collaboration features to be strategic to upstream research and development: 
It was chosen because if its collaborative features, so those were perceived to be of very high value in upstream. I 
don’t think that collaboration skills and mentality had developed in Amazon. So they don’t know the real value of 
the system (Senior IS Manager2, Nile)  
Since EmailApp2 didn’t meet the Risk Management Framework requirements imposed by Amazon, its collaboration features 
were eventually disabled post-merger.  
In a dramatic move, Amazon moved away from its regional decentralized structure toward Nile’s global structure in order to 
standardize business processes throughout the world. Management believed it to be necessary to realize cost savings from 
economies of scale. Accordingly, corporate IS (ISO) moved to standardized IS processes (e.g., customer service), 
standardized systems (e.g., call routing management system to support global customer service), and standardized 
infrastructure (e.g., desktop environment).  
However, the seismic data processing (SDP) unit continued to report to the upstream business unit instead of ISO, a point of 
contention both pre- and post-merger. SDP argued that it should remain closer to its customer base because it was the 
organization’s core competency. ISO argued that economies of scale could be leveraged in absorbing SDP into ISO. Four 
years later, this change had yet to come about. Figure 1 offers a visual representation of AmazonNile’s IS integration 
decision making. 
                                                   
9 Actual values and synergy delivery deadlines found in press releases and financial statements cannot be disclosed here in order to preserve the identity of 
the companies. 
10 Every managerial and operational policy, procedure, business process, and its IS support had control mechanisms forming an organization-wide Risk 
Management Framework. 
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Figure 1. Visual Representation of AmazonNile IS Integration Decision-making 
 
MekongIndus: By the time Indus was acquired by Mekong, it had been financially and psychologically exhausted, as the 
following quote illustrates11:  
[Indus] had gone through a lot of downsizing… were wounded a long time [ago]…that’s why the survivors 
were…not aggressive and proactive in fighting for their position in the new merged company. So size wasn’t such a 
big reason for why the acquirer had more people [post-merger]. (Indus senior IS manager). 
After the merger’s announcement, the Indus CIO declared that he would leave after the integration phase. Thus, Indus IS 
personnel entered the MekongIndus merger leaderless and dispirited.  
Mekong’s senior management paid more attention to IT in the MekongIndus merger relative to the attention it paid in prior 
acquisitions because prior IS integration had taken too long and did not deliver the synergies within the timeframe Wall 
Street had expected. This time around, MekongIndus IS integration was based on a few simple heuristics: “quickly select 
Mekong systems by default unless the Indus system provided significant cost savings.” The overarching theme for IS 
integration was “simplify and standardize” and finish the integration within ”18 months of Day One”.  
In order to achieve the promised cost savings, MekongIndus standardized its systems globally. However, in keeping with the 
MekongIndus’ federal business structure, the ISO structure was also ”federal [hybrid] in nature”. Part of IS (application 
development) reported to upstream; shared services (infrastructure) reported to ISO. In addition, Mekong had outsourced IS 
components that Indus had in-sourced, and vice-versa. In the end, most of Mekong’s outsourcing arrangements were 
adopted by MekongIndus.  
Finally, the integration team chose to adopt Mekong’s more dated ERP version rather than face the risk and delays in 
moving Mekong’s larger data set and processes to Indus’ newer ERP version with new account payable and product 
revenue capabilities. However, a couple of years later, they upgraded to the newer version. Figure 2 offers a visual 
representation of MekongIndus’ IS integration decision making. 
                                                   
11 A Wall Street Journal article also confirmed this viewpoint. This article was pointed out by a Mekong IS manager, who too found his Indus counterparts 
“pliable”. 
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Figure 2. Visual Representation of MekongIndus IS Integration Decision-making 
SeineLena: Seine was a large integrated oil and gas multi-national. Lena was a smaller, multi-national dealing in oil 
products (OP) and consumer products (CP). Seine’s OP division was Lena’s direct competitor. Seine had little OP market 
share, while Lena’s OP had leading brands, primarily in North America. It aspired to gain an international presence like 
Seine but lacked the necessary capital. Seine also found Lena’s successful CP products very attractive. Seine acquired Lena 
to gain additional product differentiation (brand value) in both the CP and OP businesses. Seine had not been very 
successful in its previous M&A activities and was therefore under considerable public scrutiny to integrate Lena successfully 
within the timeframe that Wall Street expected. In addition, Seine was to ”go global” a year after Day One, adding more 
pressure to finish the integration in time. 
Prior to the merger, Seine introduced only a few oil products to the market every year while Lena was more agile and 
released numerous oil and consumer products every year. Lena’s IT function was agile and customer-friendly; Seine’s IT 
function was slower. In addition, Seine’s IT organization hadn’t often delivered on time and within budget in the recent past, 
while Lena’s IT organization prided itself as a low-cost enabler. As Lena’s CIO notes: 
Up until [recently], Seine…had hodge-podge of [IT] stuff all over the place... [Then] they took all of the IT in 
[Seine], sucked it apart into a separate business… Then they said, “It’s a failure so we have to bring it back in.”… 
Now you have total [confusion]… Now our IT at [Lena] was really good at what we did, but again, remember that 
we weren’t an IT company. ...And [Lena] was always more responsive and low-cost than others. 
The integration team believed that it had developed good rhythm and some members of the team had known each other 
from past projects. Lena members also appreciated the open-mindedness of their Seine counterparts. One of the Big 
Rules12 of this acquisition: ‘we are going to use Seine’s systems’ was imposed. Even though Lena’s infrastructure was 
operating at a lower cost than Seine’s, following the Big Rules, a decision was made to move Lena to Seine’s infrastructure 
and standardize Lena’s desktop to match Seine’s environment. Six weeks into the decision making, however, it became 
apparent that migrating Lena’s business applications and ERP to Seine’s systems didn’t make sense. Lena members found it 
challenging to convince their Seine counterparts and their finance supervisors why they must go against the Big Rules, as 
articulated by Lena’s CIO:  
[The integration solution] wasn’t popular at all… it violated every precept of the Seine culture. Seine was going this 
way and we were going that way [away from Seine].  
                                                   
12 Big Rules is a local term introduced to Lena by Seine. Other Rules included adopting Seine’s managerial style, business practices and business 
processes. 
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In order to follow the Big Rules, the team would have had to make significant changes to Seine’s systems to support the 
same customer base and offer the same functionality in terms of sales features. Since this wasn’t practical, almost all of 
Lena’s non-ERP business applications and ERP modules were adopted in the new OP unit of Seine. For other businesses 
such as exploration and production, SeineLena continued to use Seine’s ERP modules. Figure 3 offers a visual 
representation of SeineLena’s IS integration decision making. 
 
Figure 3. Visual Representation of SeineLena IS Integration Decision-making 
5.  Case Interpretations 
5.1 AMAZONNILE 
5.1.1 Corporate and Business Strategy 
The acquisition of Nile by Amazon was a horizontal integration because both are energy producers – manufacturing 
products at the same level in the value chain.  
This corporate-level strategy was easy to infer from the interview data (See 4-1, 4-2)13 and public literature (e.g., SEC 
filings, and AmazonNile’s website). At the business–level, Amazon and Nile expected to gain competitive advantage 
through complementing properties and overlapping areas of operations, while removing redundancies would contribute to 
cost savings. Like other mergers, in order to justify such a significant organizational change to the shareholders and the 
government, the firms justified the increase shareholder value via economies of scale:  
I think there is a lot of cost saving out of it, economies of scale is a good way to get value in this industry (Nile 
Senior IS Manager). 
In short, AmazonNile was expecting to compete on cost--hence its business strategy was that of cost leadership, typically 
found in a commodity business such as oil and gas. 
 
                                                   
13 4-1 refers to Table 4, Row 1. Similarly, 5-1 implies Row 1 of Table 5, and so on. 
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Table 4: AmazonNile Corporate Strategy 
Ref.  Data Codes (based on both a priori 
and data- emergent concepts)  
4-1 Specially domestic, the production is declining…getting more and more 
global regarding exploration and production and that takes a lot of 
infrastructure and …capitalization (Nile IS Manager) 
Motivation to merge: lack of 
internal resources + desire for 
global market  
4-2 Nile was looking for a partner for financial reasons and Amazon was mainly 
interested in terms of complementary upstream properties (Amazon Upstream 
IS Manager) 
Partner Selection criteria: 
capital; complementary 
properties  
 
Table 5: AmazonNile IS Strategy 
5-1 I doubt that the CIO knew about the merger before the announcement (Nile IS 
Manager). 
Role of IS: CIO not 
perceived important to be 
involved pre-merger  
5-2 In the new company, I think we are much more critical than we were when we were 
Amazon (Amazon Upstream IS Manager). 
Role of IS: moving from 
support role to more  
critical support role 
5-3 AmazonNile has no major outsourcing. We did outsource desktop support.  After the 
merger, we brought in the Help–desk. We have contractors, but we do not 
outsource. This helps in peak-time resource management. When normal levels of 
resources are required then the contract is just terminated – and we don’t have to 
fire any employees…If we were tight on the dollars we might have considered 
outsourcing (Amazon Senior IS Manager). 
IS Sourcing: insourcing; 
use of contractors 
Reasons for outsourcing: IS 
budget cuts – view of IS as 
cost-center 
5-4 A lot of people who reported to me are part of the field jobs. They were placed in 
ABC [city] and they did not need to be in ABC.  They need to be close to the fields. I 
have to talk with people and write letters: these people are required where the 
applications were – out in the field (Nile IS Manager). 
Hybrid structure required 
5.1.2 IS Strategy 
As described earlier, IS strategy consists of the role of IS, IS sourcing, and IS structure. 
Role of IS: Both Amazon and Nile regarded IS as an overhead--as a staff function, as illustrated in the following quotes:   
But IS is mostly overhead.  All of what we do is overhead (Amazon IS Engineer). 
IS was an overhead.  Anything other than that [an oil producing unit] was overhead (Nile IS Account Manager). 
The only IS capability that AmazonNile considered strategic was the seismic data processing capability. Once the merger 
was announced, IS managers had to scramble together a set of interim solutions for Day One. Since neither CIO was 
involved in pre-merger negotiations and due-diligence, we can infer that IS did not play a significant role in the decision to 
merge (See 5-1). However, Nile was more advanced in its IS capabilities and perhaps considered the IS function to be more 
than just a support function. In the merged firm, the IS function did perhaps gain more recognition than it held in Amazon 
before the merger, but it still wasn’t considered a differentiator (See 5-2).   
IS Sourcing: Before the merger, neither firm had any significant outsourcing arrangements. Pre-merger, Amazon had 
outsourced its help-desk support but post-merger, the help-desk was brought back in-house. Post-merger, AmazonNile did 
not have any major outsourcing. Instead of outsourcing, AmazonNile relied on contractors, or buy-in rather than 
outsourcing vendors so that it would be easy to terminate contracts once the merger integration was completed (See 5-3). 
In the pre-merger phase as well, Amazon did not believe in outsourcing, because it would threaten the career development 
of loyal employees:  
You see– one joins Amazon and retires from Amazon. The people are more loyal – and tend to not believe in 
outsourcing. We allowed people to transfer from one department to another. (Amazon Senior IS Manager). 
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The IS units of Amazon and Nile remained in-house also because the firm believed that it could reduce their operating 
expenses by 5 percent by keeping control of the IS development and maintenance.  
 IS Structure: Pre-merger, Amazon had a decentralized IS structure. The firm did happen to have a centralized structure 
within the U.S., but not internationally. Amazon found that Nile had already created a globally centralized IS organization 
(shared services) before the merger. Post-merger, both business and IS functions were centralized: 
Amazon had infrastructure services [but] each division owns their own IS department. The merger resulted in a shared 
service organization of real estate of human and system that pulled it all out of business (Nile IS Senior Manager).  
However, the seismic data processing unit continued to report to the business (See 5-4).  
Table 6a: Pre-Merger IS Strategy for Amazon and Nile 
 Amazon (Acquirer) Nile (Target) 
Corporate 
Strategy: 
Horizontal 
Integration 
IS Role IS 
Sourcing 
IS 
Structure 
IS Role IS Sourcing IS Structure 
Business 
Strategy for 
both 
Amazon 
and Nile: 
Cost 
leadership 
Efficient 
Support, but 
seismic data 
processing is 
a core 
competency 
Insourcing 
+ ‘buy-in’ 
Decentralized Largely seen as 
a support 
organization, 
but seismic data 
processing a 
core 
competency. 
IS is considered 
more important 
in Nile than in 
Amazon 
Data 
Unclear14 – 
Perhaps 
Insourcing 
(As 
mentioned 
by an 
Amazon 
manager) 
Largely 
centralized 
(with some 
elements of 
a hybrid 
structure) 
 
Table 6b Post-merger IS Strategy for merged firm AmazonNile 
AmazonNile Corporate Strategy: 
Horizontal 
Integration 
IS Role IS Sourcing IS Structure 
Business Strategy: 
Cost-leadership 
Support/Efficiency, 
Seismic data 
processing still 
considered core 
competency 
Insourcing + 
‘buy-in’ 
Centralized – with a 
separate seismic data 
processing 
Tables 6a and 6b provide a summary of the state of alignment pre-merger and post-merger, respectively. We make three 
main observations: (a) the merger’s goal to achieve cost saving synergies from economies of scale, the firms’ view of IS in a 
support (overhead) role, IS sourcing, and IS structure are all in alignment as per our alignment profile illustrated in Table 1; 
(b) these three categories of alignment do not capture IS integration decisions related to issues like desktop standardization 
and choice of email platform; and (c) apart from the restructuring of the IS organization toward centralization and global 
standardization, many systems choices do not seem to be driven by strategic alignment. So, if business-IS strategic 
alignment was not a key concern in AmazonNile IS integration – then what drove the decision making? We take this up 
again in section 6, where we identify new categories to capture IS integration decisions (e.g., choice of Email platform) that 
are not accounted for by IS role, sourcing, and structure and data-emergent factors.  
5.2 MEKONGINDUS 
 5.2.1 Corporate and Business Strategy 
The MekongIndus merger was also classified as a horizontal integration because both of them were producing and 
marketing oil and gas. MekongIndus merged for the same reason as AmazonNile (See 7-1).  Each wanted a partner who 
                                                   
14 While our participants had a general idea about sourcing arrangement, they could not recall precise numbers or  percentage of budget outsourced. 
 Issue 3 Volume 8 Article 1 
157 
had both complementary properties and overlapping operations where they could take advantage of economies of scale.  
This argument was used to convince shareholders of the merger’s synergy and value:   
The whole focus of the merger is – we have promised analysts that we shall save $ [x] billion dollars in six months 
after the merger (Indus IS Manager).  
The business-level strategy was indeed cost leadership through complementary properties upstream and economies of scale 
downstream. (See 7-2).  
Table 7: MekongIndus Corporate Strategy 
7-1 The CEO – the board of directors basically came to a decision that Indus 
was just not able to keep up with the big boys. We tried different things. 
Our CEO mentioned that “we looked around and we figured that Mekong 
was the right match – where we do business, they do business” (Indus IS 
Manager). 
Motivation to 
merge: survival; 
Partner selection 
criteria: overlap in 
geographies 
7-2 Well, I would say [the primary reason for the merger is] economies of 
scale… It was in response to market’s consolidation among our peers. The 
gap in size – economies of scale argument – now Mekong and Indus were 
already doing their best and could not compete with the aggregation or 
the already inherent size of these other players (Mekong IS Manager). 
Motivation to 
merge: To gain 
economies of 
scale; following 
competition to 
survive 
5.2.2 IS Strategy 
Role of IS: Pre-merger, both merging firms considered IS to be a support function (See 8-1, 8-2).  This perhaps explains why 
neither CIO was involved in the decision to merge.  However, having learned from a previous acquisition that poor IS 
integration can be very costly for overall merger success, Mekong was more attentive to the IS integration process this time. 
Thus, while in the pre-merger phase, the role of IS in the merger was non-existent; in the post-merger phase, the IS 
integration process was viewed to be quite important, if not critical, for the success of the merger.  However, in the end, the 
role of IS still did not rise above that of a support function (See 8-2).  A Mekong IS manager observed that IS was not 
strategic enough to require a ”clean” team:  
If the merger doesn’t go through the employees dedicated to those ‘clean’ teams would have to separate from the 
company because they would have competitive information about the other company.  There weren’t any of those 
in IS. IS was not deemed as a significant competitive asset. How many PCs you got – they don’t care. 
However, it does seem that the managers of Indus’ IS function had intentions to achieve better strategic alignment as the 
merger progressed (8-3). This remains to be seen. 
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Table 8: MekongIndus IS Strategy 
8-1 In the petroleum industry, the focus is on physical assets (pipelines, ground and gas stations) 
and IS is not a differentiator (Mekong IS Manager).  
Role of IS: support 
8-2 I would say that the interest of the senior management on IS in the next phase is 
much greater than it was during the Mekong-EN3 merger. They are more than curious 
about the costs of IS integration. They are setting up mechanisms to find out what those 
costs are going to be. They have heard the other piece of industry evidence that 75 percent 
of the merger run into substantial problems of IS integration. It frequently doesn’t go well. It 
does need to be managed as a pretty significant project. Clearly the expectation is that we 
want to do it better than the Mekong-EN3 merger. That was a 4-5 year project to complete 
the entire IS integration… It is not job one, but it is a job that executives are clearly paying 
more attention to right now and how they set up this transition phase with teams (Mekong IS 
Manager).  
Role of IS: whether 
senior 
management is 
concerned about 
IS integration in 
each phase of the 
merger process 
8-3 We need to show IS as a professional integral part of the organization: (Indus IS manager) 
Assert that the budget is under control (and HAVE the budget is under control) 
Be technically astute and be aware of emerging trends 
Act as peer to Business (be able to talk about the business budget, not just the IS costs saved 
– but the overall business costs saved)  
Role of IS: how 
business should 
perceive IS (as a 
‘business’) 
8-4 But we did not do that [outsource application development] in the initial step – we are doing 
that only later. And in that case, the outsourcing model is global. Look at – ASD [country]… 
The relationship with ZZZ [outsourcing vendor located in ASD] we have had over the last 
couple of years, based on that positive experience, more and more projects are being 
looked at (Mekong IS Manager). 
IS sourcing: 
moving from 
insourcing to 
selective sourcing  
8-5 IS structure – its a hybrid… Could IS be more efficient as a centralized organization? Yes. 
But then the business units would have to give up some authority…So the IS organization… 
mirrors the business organization… We [do] have that shared services kind of a thing. 
(Mekong IS Manager) 
IS structure: 
hybrid; maps to 
hybrid business 
structure 
 
IS Sourcing: Both Mekong and Indus outsourced certain IS capabilities before the merger, which accounted for less than 25 
percent of their respective IS budgets. Post-merger the proportion of IS outsourced remained at 25 percent, according to 
one Mekong manager. Mekong had outsourced operations, while Indus had retained operations services in-house. Mekong 
had retained desktop design and support in-house, while Indus had outsourced desktop support. Mekong had outsourced 
network design and telecommunications, while Indus had insourced it.  A decision was made to outsource what Mekong 
had outsourced pre-merger.  Managers performed a market evaluation to identify “credible sourcing alternatives” with 
respect to Mekong’s outsourcing arrangements.  The choice of a vendor was more of an economic consideration and not a 
strategic one, simply because IS didn’t play a strategic role in MekongIndus:  
M1 was a manufacturer for Indus’s choice of desktop servers, M2 was Mekong. Just lined them up, made them bid 
again and they had to win it on economic terms – could have been either (Mekong IS Manager). 
At the time of data collection, the merged IS function was also looking to outsource and offshore application development 
in the future, something that neither of the two partners had done in the pre-merger phase.  (See 8-4). 
IS Structure: The IS organization structure for the merged firm is a hybrid of central and regional/local IS units. Before the 
merger, Mekong had a hybrid IS structure, while Indus had a relatively decentralized IS structure:  
[In Indus,] there is an upstream IS and there is a downstream IS – each of the major areas within the company has 
a focus on IS as well. In the Indus organization, the IS people that work in upstream are upstream employees (Indus 
IS Manager). 
After the merger, MekongIndus maintained its hybrid structure.  A Mekong IS manager actually agreed that the new 
MekongIndus IS structure should be centralized enough to achieve cost savings synergies from the merger, but noted that 
the structure’s driver was not just the efficiency achieved from having a centralized IS structure, but also the corporate 
governance structure.  He argued that the IS structure must mirror the corporate structure – if a centralized corporate model 
was suggested for the merged MekongIndus, then the IS would have reorganized itself accordingly. Instead, the business 
units were more of a ”federation” rather than under hierarchical control of a central corporate unit.  Hence, there was a 
need for a balanced IS structure in the merged IS function (See 8-5).  
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Table 9a: Pre-Merger IS Strategy for Mekong and Indus 
 Mekong (Acquirer) Indus (Target) 
Corporate 
Strategy: 
Horizontal 
Integration 
IS Role IS Sourcing IS Structure IS Role IS Sourcing IS Structure 
Business 
Strategy for 
both 
Mekong 
and Indus: 
Cost 
leadership 
Efficient/ 
Support 
Selective 
sourcing – 
about 25 
percent 
outsourced 
Decentralize
d (to match 
business 
structure) + 
centralizatio
n => 
Hybrid 
Largely seen as 
a support 
organization, 
but technical 
computing is a 
core 
competency. 
IS is considered 
more important 
in Indus than in 
Mekong 
Selective 
sourcing – 
perhaps 25 
percent  
outsourced 
Largely 
decentralize
d (with some 
elements of 
a hybrid 
structure) 
 
Table 9b: Post-merger IS Strategy for merged firm MekongIndus 
MekongIndus Corporate Strategy: 
Horizontal 
Integration 
IS Role IS Sourcing IS Structure 
Business Strategy: 
Cost leadership 
Support/Efficiency Selective sourcing 
– 25 percent 
outsourced – 
looking to 
outsource 
application 
development 
Standardized, Hybrid 
Tables 9a and 9b provide a summary of the state of alignment pre-merger and post-merger, respectively. By comparing 
these tables to Table 1, we make three observations: (a) while the role of IS seems to be aligned with the merger’s goal of 
cost leadership through economies of scale, it doesn’t seem to fit with the hybrid (federal) IS structure; (b) our initial IS Role, 
structure, and sourcing categories do not capture IS integration decisions such as ERP choices and (c) apart from their drive 
to standardize the systems and business processes globally, few integration choices were driven by the need to align IS with 
business needs initially. Once the synergy targets had been delivered, MekongIndus went back to adopt new ERP versions 
that it had previously discarded in the interests of time and risk. If business-IS strategic alignment did not cross the minds of 
the IS integration task force in the first 18 months, what did? We shall explore this further in section 6.  
5.3 SEINELENA 
5.3.1 Corporate and Business Strategy 
As discussed earlier, Seine acquired Lena largely for Lena’s well-branded products in the OP and CP businesses15:  
The business prospective prevailed: ‘why am I buying [Lena]?’ Well, they understand the [OP] business [because] 
they have market share. Why would I buy them and make them look just like us? Wouldn’t I want to preserve the 
value of purchasing this organization? And do I lose that if I try to make them look like [us]. If you look at [Seine’s] 
[OP] business, it’s primarily driven like the fuels business. [Lena] is much more like a consumer products (CP) 
business (Seine’s lead on integration team). 
Even so, Seine had justified the acquisition premium by promising to deliver many million dollars in cost savings synergies 
by removing redundancies in the small overlap between Seine’s and Lena’s OP businesses. Thus, gaining economies of 
scale was also part of the merger goals. The corporate strategy was horizontal integration because the merger involved two 
direct competitors’ Seine’s OP business and Lena. At the business level, the strategy was actually that of product 
differentiation through the addition of Lena’s branded OP and CP products. 
                                                   
15 This was also corroborated by analysts-CFO interview transcriptions on SeineLena’s website. 
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5.3.2 IS Strategy 
Role of IS: In Seine, IS was viewed as an overhead support function; in Lena, IS was referred to as a ”low-cost enabler” or a 
”successful support function”. In Lena, speed of delivery could not be compromised. Consistent with the consumer products 
business it was running, IT enabled the delivery of hundreds of new products per year at Lena. At Seine, consistent with the 
commodity fuel business it was largely running, IT was supposed to keep costs low, rather than respond quickly to 
customers’ needs. Post-merger, IS was viewed as a support function again: 
[Seine] is not of that [enabler] mind-set… [At Lena]…IT is an enabler. I can get what I need from IT at the speed I 
need it at. When the acquisition [was announced], it was still the same, nothing changed… As the merger was 
finalized… the customer saw different changes, different cost structures, [and] different service levels… Now you 
have to tell them [customer], “I am sorry, I have to follow this procedure. I can get it to you next week.” Since [Day 
One], they have just seen less freedom...more governance, [which means] longer processes, more approvals. 
[Lena’s business managers] have seen their costs sky-rocket [Lena’s infrastructure expert]. 
[Lena] way was … customer-satisfaction through prompt service and the down side is that I might not have tested 
everything. [In] Seine, it has to go through a quality assurance process, and that can’t happen immediately (Seine’s 
integration lead). 
Essentially, in the post-merger phase, Seine’s slow, process-oriented approach to handling customer requests was adopted 
in the new IS function. Seine’s chargeback policies ensured that while IS reduced its budget and became more efficient, 
Lena’s business managers saw their costs sky-rocket, now that they were part of Seine. Priorities had changed – now it was 
important to ensure quality and process control in software development; speed of delivery and customer needs had taken a 
back-seat, fitting with the role of IS as a support function. 
Table 10: Seine Lena IS Strategy 
10-
1 
IT at Seine, previous to the merger, unrelated to the merger, was on the hook for big IT 
savings. You pull them out of the business – centralize - then there is no connection to the 
business then you can send them off to the Third World and get cheap labor... They [won’t] 
call it outsourcing because it’s a Seine shop being set up there (Lena’s CIO). 
IS offshoring in 
SeineLena post-
merger 
10-
2 
At Seine, theoretically businesses make the decisions… The problem with that is that they 
don’t understand the decision in many cases. Its also hard work and they have other jobs to 
do so they turn to the IT people and ask them what they should do…in theory, the business 
makes the IT decisions. In practice, they are not. (Lena’s CIO) 
IS structure in 
Seine (‘weird’ 
hybrid) 
IS Sourcing: Lena’s IS organization, consistent with its low-cost enabler/successful support role, had outsourced help-desk 
and data-center operations. Since only 30 percent of its budget was outsourced, we can argue that Lena engaged in 
selective sourcing pre-merger. In contrast, Seine’s IS organization had been spun-off long before the merger came along. 
This spin-off provided services to Seine as an outsourcing vendor. Later, the IS organization was brought back in house:  
We (Lena) had helpdesk and data center operations outsourced. The usual suspects. Seine didn’t outsource 
anything. Seine was very heavily in-sourced (Lena’s CIO). 
Post-merger, SeineLena’s intention was to offshore its infrastructure maintenance. This was not, however, technically 
outsourcing. Instead, SeineLena was merely planning to set up its own shop offshore (See 10-1).  
IS Structure: Pre-merger, each of Seine’s business units had its own CIO. Seine’s IS structure was fairly decentralized, as 
was pointed out by Lena’s CIO earlier. Later, he termed the structure of Seine’s IS organization as a ”weird hybrid” in that it 
wasn’t really clear where the decision-making authority lay. In theory, the business units made their IT decisions; in practice, 
they didn’t (See 10-2). On the other hand, Lena’s IS structure was centralized before the acquisition. Post-merger, the new 
OP business unit (and eventually all of SeineLena) moved toward a centralized business structure, which the IS organization 
dutifully followed:  
So we have trucks that need to be scheduled… Now, with the big push towards centralization and standardization, that 
[scheduling] application choice is being done by a group in [headquarters] (Seine’s integration lead). 
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Table 11a: Pre-merger IS Strategy for Seine and Lena 
 Seine (Acquirer) Lena (Target) 
Corporate 
Strategy: 
Horizontal 
Integration 
IS Role IS Sourcing IS Structure IS Role IS Sourcing IS Structure 
Business 
Strategy Seine: 
Cost-leadership 
in the Fuels 
Business 
Lena: Product 
Differentiation 
 
Support/E
fficiency 
Insourcing Decentralized or 
‘weird hybrid’ 
‘Successful 
support’ or 
‘low-cost 
enabler’ 
Selective 
sourcing – 
30 percent  
outsourced 
Largely 
Centralized 
 
Table 11b: Post-merger IS Strategy for SeineLena 
SeineLena  
IS Role IS Sourcing IS Structure 
Business Strategy: 
Product extension 
Support/Efficiency No outsourcing – 
but offshoring 
Completely 
centralized 
 
Tables 11a and 11b provide summaries of the state of alignment in Seine and Lena pre-merger and in SeineLena post-
merger. Four observations are worth noting; First, while infrastructure decisions were largely governed by the Big Rules of 
moving all Lena operations to Seine’s infrastructure, business applications and ERP decisions were indeed driven by 
business-IS strategic alignment concerns. Specifically, Lena’s systems were adopted into Seine, precisely because Lena’s 
systems fit the consumer products and oil products businesses better than Seine’s systems. Second, pre-merger, Lena 
managed to centralize its business structure, keep its IS budget and business-costs low, and respond very quickly to the 
customer and the market. This seems counter to the current alignment literature and our research framework, which argues 
that a centralized IS organization loses its ability to respond quickly to customer/market demands. Third, by comparing it to 
our alignment profile outlined in Table 1, we observe that Seine’s pre-merger IS organization was misaligned in terms of 
role and decentralized structure of IS and its sourcing arrangements. Post-merger, SeineLena’s support role of IS and 
centralized structure were aligned with one another, but did not match the business goal of product extension/differentiation 
(see first row of Table 1)--the primary goal of the merger. Instead of outsourcing, SeineLena was offshoring its IS 
components--an arrangement that the firm believed could still deliver lower costs (as per the data), but was not part of our 
alignment framework. Fourth, our framework is not able to capture all of the participants’ terms, e.g. “weird hybrid”. These 
observations become the bases for our questions about what generated this misfit or misalignment during these mergers. 
6. Discussion – Theorizing Is Integration And Alignment 
As noted in section 5, many integration choices were not driven by the concern to realize business-IS alignment, particularly 
in the pre-merger and early post-merger phases, until synergy targets were delivered within the expected timeframe. Much 
later, AmazonNile and MekongIndus revisited their newly inherited systems and re-programmed them to make them more 
efficient or to build capabilities they had previously discarded in the interests of delivering synergies in time. Many 
integration choices are not captured by the three initial categories that our alignment framework limited us to--viz., IS role, 
sourcing and structure.  
In this section, we address our second objective, i.e. to explain the factors that shape IS integration decisions, some of 
which are business-IS alignment decisions. Simultaneously, these analyses offer new categories of alignment, which we 
hadn’t considered a priori. There are several factors such as prior merger experience, integration team dynamics, and 
scalability of systems options, which were factored into the merger integration decisions. However, we focus on the ones, 
that overshadowed the others. As discussed earlier, our data-emergent findings are also accompanied by ”enfolding prior 
literature” (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Theme #1: What explains the Role of IS Decisions? Both pre- and post-merger, all merging organizations (except Lena) 
viewed the IS function as an overhead with many avenues for cost savings. When it came to pre-merger IS integration 
planning, the business assumed that ”IS would make it happen”. In short, unlike physical assets and geographical markets, 
the IS application and infrastructure portfolio did not make or break the deal in a mature commodity industry like oil and 
gas. Thus, in all three cases, the CIOs weren’t included in the pre-merger negotiations. Adding CIOs to these secretive 
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merger negotiations meant more people could potentially break the FTC’s (Federal Trade Commission) non-disclosure 
agreements. Instead, these organizations were willing to risk that their IS cost and synergy estimates were well off the mark. 
Any variance in the IS budget would not materially affect mergers in an industry where the largest proportion of capital 
expenditure is on properties and refineries.  Thus, the two main factors that explain the minimal role of CIOs in pre-merger 
planning were: (1) the industry context and (2) FTC constraints.  
Finally, at SeineLena, when the acquirer’s management replaced the Lena management, the role of IS automatically 
changed from enabler to support function. This automatically brought the low customer service levels in alignment with the 
new support role of IS, as elaborated in the following quote: 
Did they choose a particular infrastructure because it fits the business needs? [Lena Infrastructure expert]: No. They 
are not geared [for that] … [Lena] upper management [said], “I need IT to do this for me” [Seine] upper 
management would say, “Uh-huh, I don’t think so.” So the only way alignment truly occurred was when they 
replaced the [Lena] upper management with [Seine] upper management, who were already used to the way [Seine] 
was doing IT. So they more or less forced the alignment by changing the leadership. 
Here, Seine imposed itself by re-fixing or re-establishing the ‘Role of IS’ from an enabling partner to a support function. The 
acquirer’s way resulted from the acquirer’s senior management replacing the target’s senior management. We shall explore 
Seine’s influence further in theme 4: “the acquirer’s way.”  
Theme #2: What explains IS Structure Decisions? Pre-merger, Amazon, Seine, Mekong, and Indus were operating either in 
a decentralized or a shared IS structure. Nile and Lena were more centralized. Post-merger, the focus on cost savings and 
efficient systems was more pronounced than before. The IS structure in AmazonNile and SeineLena moved toward higher 
centralization to realize the promised cost savings synergies through standardization of IS-enabled business processes.  
In this paper, we assumed IS structure would automatically align with business structure if it was first aligned with business 
strategy. However, we found that relative to strategy, business structure is in fact a stronger influence on IS structure choices: 
Early on, they were not looking at systems at all. They were thinking, "do you want to have a global organization 
and have global processes or do we want to have regional… responsibilities"? So the businesses reorganized 
themselves and we reorganized ourselves to match. (Amazon Senior IS Manager). 
IT structure [is]… a hybrid. The reason for that is corporate structure. I actually agree that more centralization 
would be more efficient for IT but in the end…that’s not the most important driver. The most important driver is the 
corporate governance [and] the business unit autonomy (Mekong Senior IS Manager). 
They chose to map the IS structure to the business structure first, regardless of how it aligned or misaligned with the role of 
IS (e.g. efficiency), business strategy, and sourcing. For example, MekongIndus continued to align its IS function structure 
with the shared business structure16, which didn’t fit with the corporate strategy to realize global economies of scale. When 
asked whether it made sense to centralize IS in order to go global, a senior Mekong IS manager on the integration team 
responded: 
The end answer was the Mekong way [i.e. adopting federal IS structure for MekongIndus]. 
[Researcher]: But wasn’t it probably more logical to go the global-way? 
Not according to Mekong.  Try to go up to somebody and say, “that’s not logical”. You will end up getting a 
[severance] package! 
Two interesting questions arise: (1) what is the association, if any, between a centralized and a global structure; and (2) 
what is “logically aligned” seems to be decided by those who have the power to hand out severance packages! We shall 
return to this acquirer’s influence later in Theme 4.  
The case of Lena was also somewhat anomalous. Pre-merger, Lena had managed to nimbly respond to customer and 
market demands despite its role of IS (low-cost enabler) and centralized IS structure. This may be explained by Brown and 
                                                   
16 Past literature (Brown, 1999) suggests that organizations use horizontal mechanisms in order to coordinate between corporate IS and business units. 
From our data, we know that MekongIndus implemented two governance mechanisms – 1) the funding structure, which ensured that IS budget was funded 
by the business for specific needs, and 2) by an organization wide IS committee that agreed to projects that needed sponsoring from more than one 
business unit. Thus, to claim that MekongIndus business and IS organizations were ‘misaligned’ is somewhat of a simplification. 
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Magill (1994), who offer a variety of antecedents that explain business-IS alignment profiles. In Lena, speed-to-market was 
non-negotiable. This was crucial to deal with competitors who generated hundreds of new consumer products every year.  
In Lena’s culture, pre-merger, speed was critical. We were [leaders], not because we were big, but because we 
could out-execute anybody. It was a competitive weapon for us. In the IT space… if you are off the budget, we will 
work with it. If you got to move a spec, we will deal with it, but you will not be late [Lena’s CIO].  
Thus, in some cases, non-structural factors such as organizational culture (viz., ”speed is non-negotiable”) are able to 
compensate for the weaknesses of vertical mechanisms (viz., centralization) (Brown, 1999). 
In addition, a number of our participants had difficulty explaining IS structure in terms of the centralization-decentralization 
typology we had offered. Instead, they repeatedly referred to IS structure decisions driven by geographical locations. In fact, 
one Amazon manager used the term “centralize” to imply senior IS management in one geographic location. Geographical 
idiosyncrasies seem to triumph over the business units’ idiosyncrasies in almost all of the six organizations pre-merger, 
perhaps as a result of having grown along regional lines before becoming large multinationals. For our participants, the 
local-global distinction seemed to take on more meaning than the centralized-decentralized distinction we had offered. The 
following data show how the centralized-decentralized continuum is an oversimplification. Including a local-global 
continuum can easily complement this. Here, ”global” implies (a) one set of business rules world-wide that ignores 
geographical idiosyncrasies, and therefore (b) the IS reporting structure is not geared to meet the specific needs of a single 
country:  
No, [global] is not [centralization]. But they are centralizing it and globalizing it at the same time. Global – it means 
there are one set of business rules …I am taking about the reporting structure, the organization, everything. There 
is no such thing as SeineLena-OP-US as an entity anymore. Now its just SeineLena-OP… There would have been 
an IT org. for US, IT org for Europe and for Pacific. No more. (Lena’s CIO)  
[Post-merger,] they decided to have a global functional structure. [Pre-merger,] on the Amazon side on each of the 
major areas had an IT organization associated with it. Mainly based upon geographic lines. There was no 
corporate CIO, so each one [country/region] had their own… (Amazon senior IS manager).   
Therefore, we believe it necessary to reconceptualize “structure” to reflect the complexities of multinational firms to include 
two dimensions:  (1) the extent of business units’ control over IS reporting and decisions along the centralization-
decentralization continuum; and (2) the extent of geographic locations’ influence over IS reporting and decisions along the 
local-global dimension as simplified in the form of a 2x2 matrix in Table 12. This also addresses the question: “what is the 
association between a centralized and a global structure?” and gives rise to four different types of IS structures: (1) 
dictatorial (centralized-global), (2) city-states (centralized-local), (3) federal (decentralized-global), and (4) tribal 
(decentralized-local). In the dictatorial arrangement, IS staff would report to a corporate IS unit and not to business units. 
Instead, there would be one corporate IS function making IS decisions for all regions/countries and ignoring geographical 
idiosyncrasies. In the city-state arrangement, IS would report to a corporate IS unit, with each major region or country 
having its own corporate IS unit. In the federal arrangement, IS would report to each business unit or line function, but these 
business units would not identify themselves according to regions or countries. In the tribal arrangement, IS would report to 
business units, and each country or region would have its own authority over each business unit.  
Table 12: IS Governance Structure impacted by Business Units and Geographies 
Decentralized Tribal Federal 
Centralized City-States Dictatorial 
Local/Regional Global 
Impact of 
Business Units 
 
Impact of Geographies 
We believe that our new typology of structure is a more refined instrument for assessing IS structure in multinationals. For 
instance, a dictatorial IS structure may describe AmazonNile post-merger. The tribal structure can better illustrate Amazon’s 
IS structure pre-merger, while MekongIndus’ pre- and post-merger ”shared” structure may be better qualified as partly tribal 
and partly city-state. Finally, SeineLena may be classified as moving toward a dictatorial IS structure, while pre-merger 
Seine’s IS structure may be classified as a weird hybrid of tribal and city-state, but where geographical differences continue 
to matter in IS decision making. In general, our data-emergent findings agree with Agarwal and Sambamurthy (2002), who 
posit: “Aligning IT executives with multiple horizontal views of the firm (i.e., processes and geographic areas) and vertical 
views of the firm (businesses) ensures that the IT function is tightly woven into the business” (p. 15). Some past literature 
(e.g. Sambamurthy and Zmud, 1999) identified ”geographic dispersion” as a contingency factor for IS governance, but did 
not identify the actual arrangements possible by taking geographic spread of a multinational into account. Sambamurthy 
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and Zmud (1999) argued that the IS function could either report to business unit or regional heads. But we offer four 
different possible arrangements, where IS could report to both business unit and regional heads, all of which easily account 
for our data now. 
Theme #3: What explains IS Sourcing Decisions? The three mergers differed in the extent of their sourcing arrangements. 
Pre-merger, Amazon and Nile mostly insourced, Mekong and Indus selectively outsourced, and Seine insourced and Lena 
had selectively outsourced. Post-merger outsourcing decisions within MekongIndus were based on whatever Mekong had 
outsourced pre-merger--the choice was governed by the acquirer, rather than by the need for strategic alignment. The 
choice of the actual vendor was made purely on economic grounds.  Three to five years after Day One, AmazonNile 
engaged in business process outsourcing offshore, MekongIndus was looking at aggressively outsourcing applications 
development offshore, and SeineLena planned to offshore but not outsource applications development.  
AmazonNile argued that insourcing in such a large company offers the necessary economies of scale that are typically 
associated with outsourcing. Through cross-case analysis, we discovered that MekongIndus (comparable in size to 
AmazonNile) had considerable success with outsourcing and planned to outsource even applications development. 
Therefore, size does not appear to be a critical factor here.   
We didn’t have to look very far to find an alternate argument for why AmazonNile did not outsource. AmazonNile strongly 
believed in its Risk Management Framework (RMF) and by outsourcing, it would lose control of systems and the RMF 
embedded within. AmazonNile managers would have to ensure that the outsourcing vendors complied with the RMF too, 
thereby increasing contract-management costs. AmazonNile’s insourcing (i.e. buy-in) arrangement was a way to: (a) deal 
with the sudden scale of merger integration projects, (b) release contractors after temporary needs are satisfied and not hurt 
full-time employees’ careers, and (c) retain control over IS projects. Prior literature identifies two of the above three reasons 
for buy-in. We have identified the third-Amazon’s culture which emphasized employees’ career development and desire to 
control.  
 SeineLena’s apparent disinclination toward outsourcing in the post-merger phase is interesting, for it does not fit with the 
support role of IS and centralized decision-making structure. However, it fits with the business strategy of product 
differentiation through Lena’s brands. So why did SeineLena centralize? It was a way to separate the business from IS in 
order to follow the new industry trend of offshoring without outsourcing. 
Theme #4: Power- The Acquirer’s Way: Above, we noticed that role of IS (in SeineLena), IS structure (in MekongIndus), and 
IS sourcing (in AmazonNile) decisions were influenced by the pre-merger organizational context--acquirer’s culture. In fact, 
the acquirer’s influence on the target was so strong that many decisions went the acquirer’s way17 unless there was a 
significant reason (e.g., cost-savings from adopting target systems) not to do so. Thus, the acquirer’s way precluded the IS 
integration team members from considering other alignment issues, at least in the short-term. For instance, even though 
many Nile systems were adopted into AmazonNile, they were “tweaked” until they complied with Amazon’s Risk 
Management Framework (RMF) – a strong cultural artifact (Schein, 1992). Often, tweaking the Nile systems proved too 
tedious to merit their adoption, in which case, the Amazon systems became the obvious choice: 
“Your hormones would be all out of whack by the time you finished meeting those [risk management framework] 
demands [to modify a Nile system] – you would rather go with the Amazon system instead!” (Amazon IS senior 
engineer) 
We can view this RMF as a disciplinary technique (Foucaultian, 1979) that takes the form of surveillance, routinization, 
rewards and sanctions to control organizational members’ behavior and disposition (Clegg, 1989). In this case, controls 
were embedded in either Amazon’s applications or modified in Nile’s applications. In short, the acquirer’s way here was 
enacted through a set of rules (RMF) that were mandatory in all adopted systems.  
Deeper analyses lead us to believe that Business-IS strategic alignment is not the innocent, objective concept it is made out 
to be in the current literature. In both MekongIndus and SeineLena, our participants believed that notions of alignment were 
governed by the acquirer’s way. For instance, revealing the duality of structure and agency (Giddens, 1984), one insightful 
senior Mekong IS manager remarked: 
                                                   
17 The ‘Mekong way’ implied Mekong’s norms, management style, reward systems, security and control procedures, outsourcing decisions, IS structure, 
processes and policies. 
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The Mekong people decided on which business model they should move to, and then the IS followed that business 
model. So power decides the alignment decisions… [Later,] the power angle subsided, because once people had 
left, the people remaining were legacy Mekong. It is unclear exactly [when] the power angle subsided. But I can 
definitely say that power and alignment are related because a fall of one implies the rise in another (Mekong senior 
IS manager).  
Thus, most of MekongIndus systems came from Mekong. Whilst Mekong managers justified their decision using alignment 
(viz., new IS structure mapped Mekong’s business structure), the dispirited Indus managers reluctantly agreed. The Mekong 
way was further reflected in the company issuing severance packages to those who challenged its definition of logical, as 
noted earlier. This can well be interpreted as discursive power (Clegg and Hardy, 1996), where discursive activities 
influenced managers’ thinking around what was logical or illogical. In addition, the large majority of the acquirer 
employees retained with MekonIndus reified the Mekong way. In sum, the acquirer decided (a) what was logical or rational, 
(b) which business structure the IS function would be aligned to, and (c) the Mekong way, or the acquirer’s way, is in fact, 
the result of a power struggle, albeit a mild one, to constantly fix and re-fix rules and meanings (Clegg, 1989).  
In the above cases, we have seen the mechanisms through which the acquirer’s way has manifested, through fixing and re-
fixing of rules, often influencing the meaning of alignment that depends on the chosen frame of reference. Further 
exploration of organizational culture18 and power and their relation to alignment and IS integration are beyond the scope of 
this paper, but should become an agenda for future research.  
Theme #5: External factor: Wall Street’s Synergy and Timeframe Expectations (the Cost-savings Mantra): In AmazonNile 
and MekongIndus, the overriding focus on achieving cost saving synergies promised to Wall Street within an expected 
timeframe may have come at the cost of temporarily ignoring alignment. The emphatic focus on short-term19 cost-saving 
synergies began with the synergy forecast during due-diligence. Synergy forecasts depend on ”assumptions concerning 
drivers of cash-flow” and historical industry averages, and are ”subject to the vagaries of predicting revenues, costs, 
margins and investments” (Schweiger, 2002; Sirower, 1997). Instead of treating synergy as a forecast, these organizations 
viewed it as a goal to be achieved at any cost. Synergy expectations became written in concrete to justify a hefty acquisition 
premium that the acquirer paid over the target’s fair market value. Thus, the synergy forecast became institutionalized as a 
symbol. The following two quotes reflect this cost-saving mantra embedded in rather myopic, but necessary systems 
integration choices: 
Early on …it is a fairly high level estimate  and then make a statement [publicly] … without knowing mechanically 
what the issues are going to be….Now is just more [of a] time crush thing and expectation by [certain time]. [You 
wonder:] can you deliver what's been promised at the high level by actually turning off the system? ... There wasn't 
going to be any less than that $ [x] million.  They were going to cut the trees unless they got to the estimate… 
Clearly this number drives what you have to come up with.  “Don't stop till you fill it up!”  And you will fill it up.  No 
other answer is acceptable (Emphasis in original, Mekong senior IS manager). 
That [Synergy estimate] then becomes non-negotiable. The street expects it; therefore you will find a way. Of course 
it does [cut into the quality of the decisions]! Of course it does. No question. But, it’s a fact of life (Lena’s CIO). 
Thus, both synergy-estimation and synergy-realization come under intense time pressure, where the only option is to cut 
acceptable and even unacceptable corners. 
Even in the case of SeineLena, where the merger’s business strategy was product differentiation through Lena’s brands, the 
concern for business-IS alignment surfaced only after six weeks of struggling to enforce ”the Seine way”. By chance, 
adopting Lena’s systems could be justified from both alignment and synergy rationales. Hence, the pressure to deliver the 
synergies was not felt to be the key driver during the SeineLena integration. Still, no systems solution was viable unless it 
delivered the promised synergies within the short term of one year expected by Wall Street’s analysts.  
Well, you have to do both [short & long-term]. The first objective is [to] meet the Street commitment… Any solution 
that doesn’t do that is not a viable solution. Within that what’s the best [long-term] answer (Lena’s CIO). 
                                                   
18 We found that cultural boundaries differ from organizational boundaries. For instance Amazon Chemicals was actually akin to Nile – they both had a 
flatter organization structure. Similarly, Mekong and Indus managers in [city1] had met previously in conferences and ‘bonded’ ‘against’ their counterparts 
in [city2]. 
19 This discrepancy between long-term financial progress and short-term financial performance is not new: The outsourcing literature also (Loh and 
Venkataraman, 1992) shows that when organizations outsourced IS, their stock prices went up, but  after 10 years it could not be determined if those 
outsourcing arrangements resulted in long-term financial success. 
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To understand why synergy forecasts trigger extreme cost-cutting and short-term thinking, we can draw on institutional 
theory (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) or symbolism – “what is right” (e.g., Astley, 1984; Mitroff, 1983).  Haspeslagh 
and Jemison (1987) already question how merger synergies are estimated and how they impact integration decisions. 
Frommer (2001) introduces ”expectation theory” where she alludes to business expectations (expected synergies) that drive 
integration decisions. Similarly, the financial literature discusses whether managers perceive the market to be myopic in 
rewarding short-term behavior at the cost of longer-term goals (e.g., Demirag, 1998). In fact, Australian banks’ short-term 
need to reduce complexity of integration (Johnston and Yetton, 1996) may have been symptomatic of similar underlying 
factors. 
Theme #6: IS Integration Dimension--Applications, Infrastructure, Processes: Factors such as the acquirer’s way and Wall 
Street’s expectations explain not just the role of IS, IS structure, and IS sourcing, but also the choice of applications (e.g., 
email platform) and infrastructure. Our a priori categories did not preclude us from recognizing other data-emergent 
dimensions of integration decisions. This category as originally conceived by Henderson and Venkatraman (1992) could 
also have been part of our alignment framework. However, they had not outlined measures for identifying various IS 
applications and systems development methodology and IS-enabled business processes. Based on our data, we suggest a 
classification along a simple standardized-unique continuum, which can eventually be mapped to sourcing and structure 
profiles. Thus, standardization of Applications, Infrastructure, IS Processes, and IS-enabled business Processes (AIP) is not 
the same as IS structure. Hence the need for a separate category:  
[To] backup their servers, if all of them are using different software, different procedures, different providers, 
backing up for different periods of time then the problem would be more complex than if you used consistent 
hardware, software, suppliers and processes. The inconsistency can become very expensive. Standardization 
typically means more efficiency (Amazon Senior IS Manager). 
In the local operations, in Spain, we do credit differently – you have to give [customers] this kind of credit because 
our competitors are offering them this kind of credit etc. Now SeineLena says, no. Spain is just like France, which is 
just like US…. The biggest implication is that they are doing away with local systems.  
[Researcher]: Basically, does globalization mean standardization? 
In this case, yes. For Seine, yes… one global [ERP] system. 
[Researcher]: So does it make sense to have one dimension on standardization and another on local and global? 
It makes perfect sense… [There could be something that is global but not standardized]…Or something that is not 
global but standardized. (Lena’s CIO) 
From the above data, we can infer that IT-enabled standardization is used to ensure that business processes are 
standardized according to one set of global business rules. This standardization enables efficient management practices and 
purchasing power, which then lead to increase economies of scale. For firms like post-merger AmazonNile, MekongIndus, 
and SeineLena, following a global strategy can better coordinate global processes by enforcing centralization (Ives and 
Jarvenpaa, 1995). Efficiencies and economies of scale will be highest in merging systems where the degree of overlap and 
redundancy is high as a result of supporting almost identical products and business processes. This was the case in 
AmazonNile and MekongIndus. 
In sum, several other factors surfaced in theorizing IS integration decision-making, such as scalability of systems, support for 
multiple international languages, acceptable risk of change in migrating to the selected system, and prior merger 
experience. However, there were two primary ones:  system costs (cost-driver), and the system heritage (heritage-driver). The 
cost-driver was a direct result of the pressure to realize synergies expected by Wall Street. The heritage-driver20 was a direct 
result of the power struggle between the acquirer and the target, often curtailed by the urgency to deliver the promised 
synergies within a given timeframe. These drivers simplified and quickened the pace of IS integration decision making. 
Together they described a common heuristic in the pre-merger and merger phases: “unless the target’s systems provide 
significant cost-savings, select the acquirer’s system.” As months went by, this heuristic gave way to questions such as “will 
our system do what the new business needs?” Thus, we believe that multiple theories (i.e., alignment, expectation theory, 
power) may together explain IS integration decisions during M&As, as depicted in Figure 4. Essentially, Figure 4 illustrates 
the interrelations amongst these factors. It also shows our a priori framework, juxtaposed against our data-emergent factors 
and alignment categories. 
 
                                                   
20 Ease of transition from one system to another was another heritage-driver. The acquirer, with greater number of users per system, found it more difficult 
to transition to the target’s systems. 
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Figure 4. Factors explaining various categories of IS integration decisions during mergers 
 
In Figure 4, the factors are organized further into industry, organizational and merger context--providing a broader 
framework into which we may enfold and compare prior literature. We will conclude the process of enfolding prior literature 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) by comparing our findings with Wijnhoven et al., (2006), Brown et al. (2003) and Johnston and Yetton 
(1996) in order to address issues of generalizability (see Table 13).  
In comparing our three U.S.-based mergers against Wijnhoven et al.’s (2006) small Dutch hospital mergers, we observe 
that in the Netherlands, the government plays a key role, while in the U.S. – it’s Wall Street that plays the key role. In the 
Netherlands, the concept of user-participation is strongly woven into organizational cultures, but this is very much absent in 
the U.S.-based mergers observed. While government procedures slowed down the consolidation at one of the hospital 
mergers, the private-sector mergers moved with great speed. Many of these differences can be explained given the national 
culture and industry context. The emphasis on cost savings and integration speed were evident in the Sallie Mae acquisition 
(Brown et al., 2003) – again U.S.-based and answerable to Wall Street. There, a key IS integration choice was resolved by 
McKinsey, which used a similar heuristic to that adopted by MekongIndus – “adopt the system of the dominant company to 
reduce the integration risk” (p. 18). This same risk-avoidance stance was initially lacking in the Australian bank merger 
(Johnston and Yetton, 1996), but crept in after the banks started losing their customer base. Both the Dutch hospital 
mergers and the Australian bank merger proceeded very slowly, perhaps due to the strong government involvement. In 
short, the emphasis on cost-savings and speed may primarily be expected (as of now) in U.S.-based publicly-held mergers.  
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Table 13: Enfolding prior literature 
Case/ 
Authors 
National 
Context 
Industry 
Context 
Type of 
ownership 
Merger 
Strategy 
Key Factors Explaining IS 
Integration Decisions 
Sallie Mae 
and USA 
Group (Brown 
et al., 2003) 
US Student 
Loan 
Publicly-held 
+ Non-profit 
Vertical 
Integration 
- Scalability 
- Cost  
- Imminent loan season 
- Reduce integration risks 
Three 
hospitals 
(Wijhoven et 
al, 2006) 
Netherlands Hospitals Government Horizontal 
Integration 
- User Participation 
- Government Regulations 
- Time and cost-savings not 
urgent 
CBA and SBV 
(Johnston and 
Yetton, 1996) 
Australia Banks Federal and 
State 
Government 
Horizontal 
Integration 
- Need to reduce integration 
complexity 
- IT configuration 
incompatibility 
AmazonNile & 
MekongIndus 
Major US 
presence 
Oil & Gas Publicly-held Horizontal 
Integration 
driven by 
economies of 
scale 
- Short-term need to deliver on 
Street’s synergy expectations 
- Acquirer’s Way 
- Business Structure 
- Geographic Dispersion 
SeineLena Major US 
presence 
Oil & Gas Publicly-held Horizontal 
Integration 
driven by 
product 
extension 
- Motivation to merge (viz., 
product extension);  
- The Acquirer’s Way 
- Short-term need to deliver on 
Street’s synergy expectations 
- Geographic Dispersion 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have answered a recent call by Wijnhoven et al. (2006) for in-depth studies that aim at theory-building for 
IS integration decision making. Therefore, one of the objectives of this paper was to examine IS Integration decision making 
from a business-IS alignment perspective. We find that while the framework is robust in general, it does not address IS 
infrastructure and processes. Moreover, the proposed conceptualization of IS structure is not fine-grained enough to deal 
with complex multinationals. We therefore introduced the concept of geographic influence on IS structure in Table 6 and 
standardization-uniqueness of IS applications, infrastructure, and processes (AIP).  
Our second objective was to identify factors that govern IS integration decisions. We find that: (1) Two mergers had a 
systematic IS integration logic, but couldn’t afford to be driven by business-IS alignment goals in the pre-merger and early 
post-merger phases. (2) The industry context of oil and gas ensured from the outset that IS would function in a support role. 
(3) The FTC constraints embedded in the merger context ensured that CIOs were not included in initial synergy estimation. 
(4) Instead of corporate and business strategy, the key driver of IS structure was (a) business structure and (b) geographical 
dispersion of multinationals. (5) In general, sourcing, structure and applications/infrastructure choices were governed by the 
Acquirer's Way and Wall Street's Synergy and timeframe expectations. (6) Only in SeineLena, did business-IS strategic 
alignment play a key role in determining which business applications and ERP systems would be inherited. (7) Only after 
Wall Street's expectations had been delivered did these merging organizations return to ask themselves  “Do our systems 
truly support the new business?” These factors build on those previously identified such as cost and scalability (Brown et al., 
2003), short-term need to reduce integration complexity (Johnston and Yetton, 1996), government (institutional) pressures, 
and hospital user associations (Wijnhoven et al., 2006).  
The alignment literature would lead one to believe that IS integration is successful when the new IS strategy and portfolio of 
applications, people, and infrastructure support the goals of the newly merged business. Our results suggest this belief is 
unrealistic – integration success is meaningful only if the promised synergies are realized in the given timeframe. As 
previously argued, the estimated synergies take on a life of their own once announced to investors and financial analysts. 
Under such extreme scrutiny by Wall Street, it is possible that organizations are forced to ostensibly ignore alignment goals 
for the sake of synergy goals in pre-merger and early post-merger. 
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Limitations  
Our theory-building would have been enriched had we found a case that focused on a combination of cost leadership and 
product differentiation as its business strategy. This would have completed case selection based on theoretical-variance. 
However, it is difficult to gain access to merger specifics, and we were unable to access such a site. Furthermore, in such 
sensitive contexts as M&As, willing study participants were few and far between. To better understand IS integration in the 
longer term, a longitudinal, possibly ethnographic study of a broad spectrum of M&A participants (including CEOs, or 
business managers) is called for. There were two drawbacks in the Hirschheim-Sabherwal framework--first, their IS structure 
category wasn’t fine-grained enough for large multinationals; and second, it overlooked IS applications and infrastructure. 
Our data-emergent findings have specifically attempted to counter these limitations. 
We must emphasize that our understanding remains limited to mergers of large, publicly held firms in the oil and gas 
industry, with a major U.S. presence, where IS functions in a support role. Theoretical insights on the relationship of 
alignment and power, and the institutionalized symbolic influence of synergy expectations from Wall Street may apply to 
non-merging contexts. However, a merger context accentuates the significance of such theoretical lenses, rendering them 
more noteworthy than non-merger contexts.  
This study builds on the alignment literature by fine-tuning the IS structure category and by adding to our original alignment 
framework the standardization-unique continuum to assess an AIP category. It builds on M&A literature by providing a 
coherent explanatory theory of IS integration decision making through concepts such as the acquirer’s way and synergy and 
time pressures. Not only does it suggest the strong role of the concept of power, it highlights the mechanisms through which 
it penetrates the process of alignment. Last, it cautions managers who may be too enamored by the acquirer-target business 
fit to heed the consequences of not planning for the true cost of IS integration. This could result in unrealistic acquisition 
premiums, justified by unrealistic synergies (Sirower, 1997).  
Business-IS alignment is considered to be a critical phenomenon in both academia and practice. However, further research 
should explore the latent meaning of business-IS alignment and its relationship with power, rendering its understanding 
more political than objective. Moreover, when total IS restructuring which is driven by dramatic events (i.e., mergers), 
normal incremental changes and associated ideas of strategic alignment may not be feasible. Then, there may not even be 
an IS ”strategy” to support cost leadership; if we view IS just as a cost, and focus on lowering costs, there is no need to 
align. In such cases, are the cost-savings realized from economies of scale strategic or excessive? Future research must 
address this question. It should also articulate IS integration success and its measures, and the appropriate speed of IS 
integration.  
Acknowledgments 
 
We thank the IS managers of AmazonNile, MekongIndus and SeineLena for their sincere and patient participation and 
reflections throughout this project. We also acknowledge Leiser Silva, Andrew Szilagyi, and Kalle Lyytinen and the 
anonymous reviewers of earlier drafts for their invaluable guidance.  
  
170 
Issue 3 Volume 8 Article 1 
References 
Allen, D., Kern, T., and Mattison, D. “Culture, power and politics in ICT outsourcing in higher education institutions,” 
European Journal of Information Systems (11:2), 2002, pp. 159-173 
Aponovich, D. “IS Integration Seen as Key to Merger Success”, CIO Update, March 27, 2002, 
http://www.cioupdate.com/reports/article.php/11050_999541 - (Keys to the Kingdom: How an Integrated IS 
capability can increase your odds of M&A success). 
Agarwal, R. and Sambamurthy, V.  “Principles and Models for Designing the IT Function,” MIS Quarterly Executive, (1:1), 
2002, pp. 1-16 
Ashkanasky, N. M., and Holmes, S. “Perceptions of organizational ideology following a merger: A longitudinal study of 
merging accounting firms”, Accounting, Organization and Society (20:1), 1995, pp. 19-34 
Benbasat, I., Goldstein, D., and  Mead, M. “The Case Research Strategy in Studies of Information Systems,” MIS Quarterly 
(11:3), 1987, pp. 369-386 
Bergh, D. D. “Executive Retention and Acquisition Outcomes: A Test of Opposing Views on the Influence of Organizational 
Tenure,” Journal of Management (27:5), 2001, pp. 603-622 
Berman, D. “Year-End Review of Markets & Finance 2004; Simmering M&A Sector Reaches a Boil; Crush of December 
Activity Signals M&A Is Heating Up; Will Deals Beget Deals?” Wall Street Journal (Eastern edition), January 3, 2005. 
pg. R.10 
Bhaskar, R. The Possibility of Naturalism, Harvester, Brighton, 1979 
Brown, C. "Horizontal Mechanisms Under Differing IS Organization Contexts," MIS Quarterly (23:3), 1999, pp.421-454  
Brown, C. V., and Magill, S. L. “Alignment of the IS functions with the enterprise: towards a model of antecedents”, MIS 
Quarterly (18:4), 1994, pp. 371 – 403    
Brown, C. V., and Magill, S. L. “Reconceptualizing the Context-Design Issue for the Information Systems Function”, 
Organization Science (9:2), 1998, p.176-194 
Brown, C. V., and Renwick, J. S. “Alignment of the IS Organization: the Special Case of Corporate Acquisition,” Database, 
(27:4), 1996, pp. 25 – 33 
Brown, C. V., Clancy, G. and Scholer, R. “A Post-Merger IS Integration Success Story: Sallie Mae,” MIS Quarterly Executive 
(2:1), 2003, pp. 15 – 27 
Buono, A. F., and Bowditch, J. L. The Human Side of Mergers and Acquisitions, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Publishers, 
1989 
Camillus, J. C., and Lederer, A. L. “Corporate Strategy and the Design of Computerized Information Systems,” Sloan 
Management Review (26:3), 1985, pp. 35-42 
Canella, A. A.,  and Hambrick, D.C. “Effects of executive departures on the performance of acquired firms,” Strategic 
Management Journal (14:Special Issue), 1993, pp. 137-152 
Chan, Y., Huff, S. L., Barclay D. W., and Copeland, D.G. “Business Strategic Orientation, Information Systems Strategic 
Orientation, and Strategic Alignment,” Information Systems Research (8:2), 1997, p. 125-150 
Clegg, S. R. Frameworks of Power, Sage, London, 1989 
Clegg, S. R. and Hardy, C. “Some Dare Call It Power,” in Handbook of Organizational Studies, Clegg et. al. (Eds), Sage 
Publications, 1996, pp. 622-641  
Demirag, I. S. “Board of Directors’ short-term perceptions and evidence of managerial short-termism in the UK,” The 
European Journal of Finance (4), 1998, pp. 195-211 
Denzin, N.K. The Research Act: A theoretical introduction to sociological methods, McGraw Hill, New York, 1978.  
DiMaggio, P., and Powell, W. “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in 
Organizational Fields,” American Sociological Review (48:2), 1983, pp. 147-160 
Dibbern, J., Goles, T., Hirschheim, R. and Jayatilaka, B., “Information systems outsourcing: a survey and analysis of the 
literature,” Database, (35:4), pp.6-102, Fall 2004 
Du Boff, R. and Herman, E. "Mergers, Concentration and the Erosion of Democracy," Monthly Review (53:1), 2001, 
http://www.monthlyreview.org/0501duboff.htm 
Eccles, R.G., Lanes, K.L., and Wilson, T.C. “Are You Paying Too Much for That Acquisition?,” in: Harvard Business Review, 
1999, p. 136. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. “Building theory from Case Study Research”, Academy of Management Review (14:4), 1989, pp. 532-
550 
Empson, L. “Mergers between professional services firms: Exploring an undirected process of integration”, (Eds.) Cooper, C. 
and Gregory, A., Advances in Mergers and Acquisitions (1), Elsevier Science, Amsterdam, 2000, pp. 205 – 238 
Fielder, K. D., Grover, V., and Teng, J. “An Empirically Derived Taxonomy of Information Technology Structure and Its 
Relationship to Organizational Structure,” Journal of Management Information Systems (13:1), 1996, pp. 9 – 34 
Fowler, A. and Jeffs, B. “Examining Information Systems Outsourcing: A Case Study from the United Kingdom,” Journal of 
Information Technology (13), 1998, pp. 111-126. 
 Issue 3 Volume 8 Article 1 
171 
Frommer, R. “Between Expectations and Experience – An Analysis of Post-Merger Integration of Two Mergers,” Department 
of Industrial Economics and Management, Kungliga Tekniska Hogskolan (Sweden), Helsingfors: Sweden, 2001 
Graebner, M. E. “Momentum and serendipity: how acquired leaders create value in the integration of technology firms,” 
Strategic Management Journal (25), 2004, pp.  751-777 
Greewood, R., Hinings, C., and Brown, J. “Merging Professional Services Firms”, Organization Science (5:2), 1994, 239-
257.  
Giacomazzi, F., Panella, C., Pernici, B., and Sansoni, M. “Information Systems Integration in Mergers and Acquisitions: A 
Normative Model”, Information and Management (32:6), 1997, pp. 289-302 
Giddens, A. (1984). The Constitution of Society, Cambridge: Polity Press 
Hammer, K. “IS integration – the key to successful M&As”, Banking 2000, 
http://www.bankingmm.com/Features/featurespage3.htm, retrieved (January 29, 2004)  
Haspeslagh, P. C and Jemison. D. B. “Acquisitions − Myths and Reality”, Sloan Management Review, Winter 1987, pp. 
53-65 
Haspeslagh, P. C and Jemison. D. B. Managing acquisitions: Creating value through corporate renewal, The Free Press, 
New York, N. Y., 1991 
Henderson, J., and Venkatraman, N. “Strategic Alignment: A Model for Organizational Transformation through Information 
Technology,” in Transforming Organizations, T.A. Kochan and M. Useem (eds.), Oxford University Press, New York, 
NY, 1992, pp. 97-117.  
Hirsch, P. M. “From ambushes to golden parachutes: Corporate takeovers as an instance of cultural framing and 
institutional integration,” American Journal of Sociology (91), 1986, pp. 800-837 
Hirschheim, R., and Sabherwal, R. “Detours in the Path toward Strategic Information Systems Alignment”, California 
Management Review (44:1), 2001, pp. 87-109 
Hitt, M. A., Ireland, R. D., and Hoskisson, R. E. Strategic management: competitiveness and globalization, South-Western 
College Pub., Cincinnati, OH, 1999 
Ives, B. and Jarvenpaa, S. “Applications of Global Information Technology: Key Issues for Management,” MIS Quarterly 
(March), 1991, pp. 33-49 
Jemison, D.B., and Sitkin, S.B. “Corporate Acquisitions: A Process Perspective,” Academy of Management Review (11:1), 
1986, pp. 145-163. 
Johnston, K., and Yetton, P. “Fit, Compatibility and Models of Change: Integrating IS Divisions in a Bank Merger,” Journal 
of Strategic Information Systems (5:3), 1996 
Karimi, J., and Konsynski, B.R. “Globalization and Information Management Strategies,” Journal of Management 
Information Systems (7:4), 1991, pp. 7-26. 
Kendler, P. B. “Managing M&As,” Bank Systems & Technology, Jan 14, 2004 (5:38 PM), 
http://www.banktech.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=17300936, retrieved April 16, 2004 
King, W. R. “Strategic Planning for Management Information Systems”, MIS Quarterly (2:1), 1978, p. 27-37 
Krug, J., and Hegarty, W. “Post-acquisition turnover among U.S. top management teams: an analysis of the effects of 
foreign versus domestic acquisitions of U.S. targets,” Strategic Management Journal (10:1), 1997, pp. 667 – 675 
Lacity, M., and Hirschheim, H. Beyond the Information Systems Outsourcing Bandwagon: The Insourcing Response, John 
Wiley and Sons, New York, N. Y., 1995 
Lacity, M., Willcocks, L., and Feeny, D. “The Value of Selective IS Sourcing,” Sloan Management Review, Spring 1996, pp. 
13-25 
Lacity, M.C., and Willcocks, L. P. “An empirical investigation of information technology sourcing practices: Lessons from 
experience,” MIS Quarterly (22:3), 1998, pp. 363–408 
Lajoux, A. The Art of M&A Integration, New York: McGraw Hill, 1998  
Lincoln, Y., and Guba, E. Naturalistic Inquiry, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1985 
Linder, J. C. Integrating organizations where information technology matters, Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard University, 
1989. 
Loh, L., and Venkatraman, N. “Stock Market Reaction to IS Outsourcing: An Event Study,” Sloan School of Management, 
MIT, Working Paper, 1992 
Lubatkin, M., Calori, R., Very, P., and Veiga, J.F. “Managing mergers across borders: A two-nation exploration of a 
nationally bound administrative heritage,” Organization Science (9:6), 1998, pp. 670-684. 
Marks, M. L., and P. H. Mirvis, Joining Forces: Making One Plus One Equal Three in Mergers, Acquisitions, and Alliances, 
Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, 1998 
Main, T. and Short, J. “Managing the Merger: Building Partnership Through IS Planning at the New Baxter”, MIS Quarterly 
(13:4), 1989, pp. 469-484 
McCann, J. E., and Gilkey, R. Joining Forces: Creating and Managing Successful Mergers and Acquisitions, Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, 1988 
McKiernan, P., and Merali, Y. “Integrating information systems after a merger,” Long Range Planning (28:4), 1995, pp. 54-
62. 
  
172 
Issue 3 Volume 8 Article 1 
Miles, M.B., and Huberman, A.M. Qualitative Data Analysis, Sage, Beverly Hills, CA, 1984.  
Miles, R.E., and Snow, C.C. Organizational Strategy, Structure and Process, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY, 1978. 
Mintzberg, H. (1979) The Structuring of Organizations, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 
Mintzberg, H. Power In and Around Organizations, The Theory of Management Policy Series, Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood 
Cliffs, 1983 
Mitroff, I. I. “Archetypical Social Systems Analysis: On the Deeper Structure of Human Systems,” Academy of Management 
Review (8), 1983, pp. 387-397 
Orlikowski, W.J., and Baroudi., J. J. “Studying information technology in organizations: research approaches and 
assumptions,” Information Systems Research (2:1) 1991, pp 1-28 
Pablo, A.L. “Determinants of acquisition integration level: A decision-making perspective,” Academy of Management 
Journal (37:4), 1994, pp. 803-836. 
Pangarkar, N. “What Drives Merger Behavior of Firms? Strategic Momentum versus Bandwagons,” International Journal of 
Organization Theory & Behavior (3:1/2), 2000, pp. 37-72 
Pare, G. “Investigating Information Systems with Positivist Case Research,” Communications of the Association for 
Information Systems (13:18) 2004 
Pearce, J. A., and Robinson, R. B. Strategic management: strategy formulation and implementation, Homewood: R.D. Irwin, 
1985   
Peppard, J., and Ward. J “Mind the Gap: Diagnosing the Relationship Between the IS Organization and the Rest of the 
Business,” Journal of Strategic Information Systems (8:1), 1999, 167-194 
Porter, M.E. “From Competitive Advantage to Corporate Strategy”, Harvard Business Review (65:3), May-June 1987, pp. 
43-59.  
Reich, B. H., and Benbasat, I. “Factors that influence the social dimension of alignment between business and information 
technology objectives,” MIS Quarterly (24:1), 2000 pp. 88-113 
Rockart. J., Earl, M., and Ross, J. “Eight Imperatives for the New IS Organization”, Sloan Management Review (38:1), 
1996, pp. 43-55 
Sabherwal, R., and Chan, Y. “Alignment between Business and IS Strategies: A Study of Prospectors, Analyzers, and 
Defenders,” Information Systems Research (12:1), 2001, p11-33 
Sabherwal, R., Hirschheim, R., and Goles, T. “The Dynamics of Alignment: Insights from a Punctuated Equilibrium Model, 
Organization Science (12:2), 2001, p. 179-197  
Sambamurthy, V. and Zmud, R. W. “Arrangements for Information Technology Governance: A Theory of Multiple 
Contingencies”, MIS Quarterly (23:2), 1999, pp. 261–290 
Sanders, P. “Phenomenology: A New Way of Viewing Organizational Research.,” in: Academy of Management Review, 
1982, p. 353 
Schein, E. H. Organizational Culture and Leadership (2nd Ed.). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992 
Schweiger, D. M&A Integration: A Framework for Executives and Managers, New York: McGraw Hill, 2002  
Schweiger, D. M., and Goulet, P. M. “Integrating mergers and acquisitions: an international research review”, (Eds.) 
Cooper, C. and Gregory, A., Advances in Mergers and Acquisitions (1), 2000, pp. 61–92 
Scott, W. R. “The Adolescence of Institutional Theory,” Administrative Science Quarterly (32:4), 1987, pp. 493-511  
Segars, A., and Grovers, V. “Profiles of Strategic Information Systems Planning”, Information Systems Research (10:3), 
1999, pp. 199 – 232 
Shrivastava, P. “Postmerger Integration,” Journal of Business Strategy (7:1), 1986, pp. 65-76. 
Sirower, M. The Synergy Trap, New York: Free Press, 1997 
Stahl, M. J. and Grigsby, D.W. Strategic Management for Decision-making, Boston: PWS-Kent, 1991 
Suddaby, Roy “From the Editors: What Grounded Theory Is Not,” Academy of Management Journal (49:4), 2006, pp. 
633-642 
Tetenbaum, T. J. “Seven Key Practices That Improve the Chance For Expected Integration and Synergies,” Organizational 
Dynamics, 1999 (28:2), pp 22-36 
Thompson, J. D. Organizations in Action, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY, 1967.  
Thompson, A. A. and Strickland, A.J. Strategic Management: Concepts and Cases, Plano, Business Publications, 1984 
Tractinsky, N., and Jarvenpaa, S. L. “Information Systems Design Decisions in a Global versus Domestic Context,” MIS 
Quarterly (19:4), 1995, pp. 507-534 
Trautwein, F. “Merger Motives and Prescriptions,” Strategic Management Journal (11:4), 1990, pp. 283 – 295 
van Maanen, J. “Reclaiming Qualitative Methods for Organizational Research: A Preface,” in Qualitative Methodology, J. 
Maanen (ed.), Sage, Newbury Park, 1979, pp. 9-18. 
Walsham, G. "The Emergence of Intrepetivism in IS Research," Information Systems Research (6:4), 1995, pp. 376-394. 
Walsham , G., and Waema, T. “Information systems strategy and implementation: a case study of a building society,” ACM 
Transactions on Information Systems (12:2), 1994, p.150-173  
Weber, Y., and Pliskin, N. “The effects of information systems integration and organizational culture on a firm’s 
effectiveness”, Information and Management (30), 1996, pp. 81–90 
 Issue 3 Volume 8 Article 1 
173 
Wijnhoven, R., Spil, R., Stegwee, R. and Fa, R. “Post-merger IT integration strategies: An IT alignment perspective”, Journal 
of Strategic Information Systems, (15:1) March 2006, pp. 5-28 
Yin, R. Case Study Research- Design and Methods, 3rd Edition, Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2003 
Yoo Y., Lyytinen K., Heo D., “Closing the GAP: Toward a Process Model of Post-Merger Knowledge Sharing”, forthcoming, Information 
System Journal, 2007 
 
  
174 
Issue 3 Volume 8 Article 1 
Appendix A 
Interview Guide 
General M&A Background Questions: 
1. What motivated you to merge? 
2. Has the merger proved successful so far?  
IS-specific questions: 
1. What was the role of IS in the merger/acquisition, both before the merger and during the integration process?   
2. What was your planned procedure to merge the IS component of your companies?   
3. How do you make choices about IS infrastructure, IS processes and IS people and IS outsourcing?  
4. How did you decide on centralization, decentralization, or hybrid structures? 
5. What synergies were you expecting from IS integration?  
6. How did you set up integration teams? 
7. How was IS previously aligned with the business and what changes were necessary to ensure it was re-aligned 
in the merged companies?  
8. Who made the decisions?  Why?   
9. How do you decide that you have a successful IS integration? 
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